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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the effects ofWTO entry on China's economy. Based on 
the theory of comparative advantage and the current situation of major Chinese 
industries, this paper analyzes and predicts which Chinese industries will have more 
opportunities and which ones will face more challenges under the WTO system. Other 
issues addressed in this project are the reform and adjustment of China's foreign trade 
regime, ownership system, industrial structure, labor structure and social safety net. By 
using secondary data and combining quantitative and qualitative analyses, the paper 
argues that each industry faces opportunities and challenges. However, in general, 
Chinese labor-intensive industries such as the textile and garments, and consumer goods 
industries will benefit more from WTO entry, whereas the land-, capital- and technology-
intensive industries such as the staple foodstuff, the auto, the iron and steel, the chemical 
and pharmaceutical, and the high-tech industries will face severe foreign competition. In 
a nutshell, a short-term price has to be paid for the long-term benefit ofWTO accession 
on the Chinese economy. 
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I. Overview 
It has been argued that isolation from the international economy from 1949 to 
1978 was an important factor in explaining China's technological backwardness and 
poverty (Muo, 1999). Although China was one ofthe 23 founding members ofthe 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a signatory in 1947 (Xu, 1996), it 
did not participate in GATT activities for more than 30 years after the founding of the 
People's Republic of China in 1949. In 1982, China was, however, granted observer 
status in GATT. Following this, it formally applied for the resumption of its GATT 
membership in July 1986. The Chinese government had wished to resume its GATT 
membership before the World Trade Organization (WT0) 1 came into force in 1995, but 
this was not realized (Xu, 1996). 
The reason why China is so keen to join the WTO is that after nearly 30 years of 
isolation, the Chinese government realized that it was a big mistake to be outside the 
world economic system. Then, in the late 1970s, the central government initiated an 
"open door" policy. Consequently, this led the central government to adopt western 
development strategies and a market economy. 
Great economic success has been achieved as a result of the "open door" policy. 
The value of China's foreign trade value has increased continuously. For example, in 
1978, the total value of imports and exports was only US $20.64 billion. By 1997, this 
had reached US $325.06 billion. During the 15 years between 1982 and 1996, the annual 
1 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules 
of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the 
world's trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and 
services, exporters, and importers conduct their business. 
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growth rate of total import and export value was 13.75%. By the end of 1997, China had 
about 160,000 international trade companies and institutions. For the first time, in the 
same year China became one of the top ten trading countries in the world (HKEIA, 
1999). The entry of China into the WTO will not only increase its exports, but also lower 
the cost of its imports substantially. Zhao (1999) estimated that during the six years from 
1999 to 2005, the total import value would be about US $1,500 billion. lfthe average 
import tariff decreases by only 10%, China will save US $150 billion in foreign 
exchange. Along with the high growth rate of international trade, the growth rate of 
China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is also relatively high. During the past 22 years 
from 1978 to 1999, there were 10 years that the GDP growth rates were above 10%, and 
the average annual growth rate was 9.75% during this period (Zhen, 2000). This high rate 
of growth is very seldom seen in the world, especially when it lasts more than 20 years. It 
has been widely argued that, the openness of foreign trade has played an important role in 
China's high-rate of development and growth. 
Following the above discussion, the role that China's foreign trade plays in the 
whole economy becomes an important question. It is, therefore, imperative to highlight 
the reform of China's foreign trade regime during the last 23 years. 
I. (i) China's Foreign Trade and Its Historic Evolution (1978-2000) 
Reform ofthe foreign trade system can be divided into three stages: 1978-1991, 
1992-1999, and the years after 1999. 
1. The First Stage of Reform (1978-1991) 
Trade policy during this period was planned by the central government. For 
example, in 1978 the state decided on procurement plans for over 3,000 products for 
export, and directly arranged for the import of over 90% of import orders (Wall, Boke 
2 
and Yin, 1996). The value (or volume) and range of commodities being traded were 
firmly controlled by applying licenses and tariffs. Moreover, tariffs and licenses kept 
increasing during this period. Wall, Boke and Yin (1996) argue that, at the end of 1991, 
China's average tariff rate was 43%, 5% more than the corresponding average rate in 
1986. Similarly, the number of categories covered by export licenses was increased from 
159 in 1987 to 173 in 1989, and the categories covered by import licenses increased from 
45 to 53. Licensed trade accounted for 67% of all exports and 46% of imports (Lardy, 
1992). 
During the early period of this stage, the central government provided large export 
and import subsidies to those foreign trade companies that made losses in exports and 
imports due to distortions in China's domestic price structure. In 1987, direct fiscal 
subsidies to cover the losses were over 28 billion yuan (US $3 .38 billion) (Wall, Boke 
and Yin, 1996). The subsidies, however, were gradually phased out after 1989, because 
of the heavy burden on the central government. 
Two other major policies in this stage were the application of the "foreign 
exchange retention system" and the "dual exchange-rate system". The "foreign exchange 
retention system" was first introduced in 1979. In order to promote exports, the central 
government gave up its monopoly on the control of foreign exchange and allowed the 
export-producing firms, foreign trade companies and some government agencies, to 
retain a certain percentage of the foreign exchange they earned from their exports (Wall, 
Boke and Yin, 1996). The application ofthe dual exchange-rate system is also an export 
promoting policy. In 1981, the government set an internal exchange rate of2.8 yuan per 
US dollar for foreign trade against the official rate of about 1. 7 yuan per US dollar (Wall, 
Boke and Yin, 1996). 
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In addition to the above policies, China adopted several other export promotion 
measures, such as special programs of enhanced export credits, preferential interest rates 
on domestic currency loans to export firms, and subsidized domestic transport (Wall, 
Boke and Yin, 1996). 
2. The Second Stage of Reform (1992-1999) 
In 1992, for the first time, China's central government endorsed the "socialist 
market economy" (which is widely considered as a partial market economy) as China's 
goal of reform (Qian, 1999). However, one criterion of a market economy requires that 
"all sectors of the economy are open to international trade, with minimal tariffs or non-
tariffbarriers (quotas, licensing, etc.) or other forms of government trade control" (Wall, 
Holmes, Kempton and Grant, 1998, p. 7). Therefore, foreign trade reforms during this 
period were characterized by a process of decentralization and reduction of trade barriers 
such as tariff rates and licenses. 
From 1992, the command plans for both exports and imports were abolished 
(Wall, Boke and Yin, 1996). As a result, more enterprises and companies had the right to 
determine their own exports and imports. Import tariff rates were also substantially 
reduced during this period. For instance, China lowered its simple average import tariff 
rate2 for over 4800 items from more than 40% in 1995 to 17% in October 1997 (UDS, 
1998). On January 1st, 1999, China further lowered the tariffrates for 1014 items 
covering certain textiles, toys and forest products. The reduction brought China's simple 
average tariff rate down to 16.7% (APEC, 1999). Unlike the first stage of the reform, the 
number of categories covered by export and import licenses was reduced remarkably as 
2 One simply adds up all of the tariff rates and divides by the number of import categories. 
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well. For example, since 1993, the number of export categories subject to licensing was 
reduced from 235 to 114, and correspondingly the proportion of export value covered by 
licenses was reduced from 60% to about 30% (Wall, Boke and Yin, 1996). 
Besides the above changes, the Chinese central government unified the dual 
exchange-rate system in January 1994. With the unification of the exchange-rate system, 
the retention system was abolished, and enterprises now sold foreign exchange earned 
from exports directly to the Bank of China at listed prices. At the same time, enterprises 
can, by providing valid documents, buy foreign exchange for imports at the listed price 
(Wall, Boke and Yin, 1996). 
Compared to the previous stage of reform, China's foreign trade regime in this 
second stage was more liberalized. As a result, foreign exchange reserves jumped from 
US $19.44 billion in 1992 to US $130.07 billion at the end of 1999 (Muzi, 2001). 
Furthermore, not only has the structure of the foreign trade regime changed and become 
more liberalized, but the structure oftrade itselfhas changed. In 1999, the export value of 
manufactured products accounted for 89.8% of China's total export value, up 4.2 
percentage points over 1995, and the import value accounted for 83.8% of the total, up 
2.3 percentage points. Among the total export value, 13.7% was high-tech products in 
1999, a rise of 5.2 percentage points over 1995, while imported high-tech products 
accounted for 22.6% of the total import value, up 6.3 percentage points. The proportion 
of general trade among the foreign trade value climbed from 40.85% in 1995 to 43.11 % 
in the first six months of 1999, and the proportion of processing trade dropped from 
49.54% in 1995 to 48.74% by July 1999 (Muzi, 2001). 
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3. The Third Stage of Reform (after 1999) 
China's foreign trade regime during this stage is more suited to a liberalized 
market economy than the previous stages. Since China has opted to join the WTO, it has 
to meet the obligations stipulated by the WTO agreement, such as a lowering of import 
tariff rates. Thus, China will have to reduce its tariff rates for industrial products to 
around 10%, and eliminate tariffs on 185 information technology products by 2005 
(APEC, 1999). As part of its negotiation for WTO accession, China has committed to 
eliminating most non-tariff barriers. After full phase-in, the overall non-tariff barrier 
coverage would fall from 43% to 11% (The World Bank, 1997). China, however, will not 
completely open its foreign exchange market right after its accession to the WTO. 
Instead, it will gradually move in the direction of a freer foreign exchange market. 
During this stage of reform, the Chinese central government has made trade 
regulations and policies based on the requirements of the framework of the WTO and the 
market economy instead of the needs of a planned economy. 
At the time of writing this paper, China had signed bilateral trade agreements with 
all the members of the WTO except Mexico (which is in process). As China has agreed to 
a number of market access concessions, it is no surprise that many sectors in China will 
be adversely affected. As one top Chinese official said, "the blow will not be light, and 
pain is unavoidable" (Muo, 1999). The Chinese government has acknowledged that 
China's accession to the WTO will immediately cost more than 10 million jobs in the 
industries that lack comparative advantage (Muo, 1999). In fact, China is not completely 
ready for WTO entry. Some Chinese academics believe that China has not accomplished 
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the two major prerequisites for entry, namely, safeguarding state economic securitl and 
organizing management in accordance with market economy rules instead of central 
planning. However, Chinese policy makers believe that domestic reforms have reached a 
stage where they cannot be sustained and deepened without systematically linking them 
to external reforms. Moreover, in order to build up China's long-term capacity, the 
mainstream view argues that it is very necessary for China to join the WTO and pay a 
short-term cost. 
Some may argue that since China has achieved great success in exports, joining 
the WTO will definitely have a positive effect on China's export sector. There is no doubt 
that China has increased its export value greatly. In 1978 the export value was only US 
$14.80 billion, whereas in 1990 it had increased to US $84.05 billion, nearly five times as 
much as 12 years previously (Lardy, 1992). By the end of2000, this value exceeded US 
$205 billion (Muzi, 2001). Table 1 shows the value of exports and imports in selected 
years. For these selected categories, one can see that from 1980 to 1998 the export of 
agriculture, manufactured goods, chemicals and related products, light and textile 
industrial products, and, machinery and transport equipments increased 2 times, 1 7 times, 
8 times, 7 times, and 59 times respectively. 
3 The primary essence of state economic security is to safeguard the economic sovereignty of a state, of 
which fmancial security stands at the core. Economic security is based on formulating the right strategy for 
economic growth and enhancing a country's economic might and competitiveness. 
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Table 1: Export and Import value by Selected Categories of Commodities US$: 
Year Agriculture Manufactured Chemicals Light and Machinery 
Goods and related Textile and 
Products industrial Transport 
products Equipment 
Ex Im Ex Im Ex 1m Ex Im Ex Im 
1980 3.05 3.17 9.01 13.06 1.12 2.91 4.00 4.15 0.84 5.12 
1985 3.94 1.68 13.52 36.96 1.36 4.47 4.49 11.90 0.77 16.24 
1990 6.77 4.31 46.21 43.49 3.73 6.65 12.58 8.91 5.59 16.85 
1995 10.40 8.73 127.30 107.67 9.09 17.30 32.24 28.77 31.41 52.64 
1998 10.90 5.28 163.16 117.21 10.32 20.17 32.38 31.07 50.23 56.77 
Source: http:/ /www.stats.gov.cn/yearbook/ml/1999 _ e.htm 
However, all of these remarkable improvements in exports were achieved under 
China's partially reformed foreign trade regime, which provides strong trade protection 
and subsidies to key industries. For instance, the auto industry is under the protection of 
100-200% import tariff rates; the textile industry benefits from state subsidies to keep it 
competitive in international markets; and the agriculture sector is not only protected by 
high import tariff rates, but also receives state subsidies. This kind of trade regime will 
not be allowed to apply under the WTO system. Thus, once these protections and 
subsidies are dismantled, many Chinese industries and economic sectors will face 
competition from which they are currently protected. Therefore, the past export pattern 
and growth is not a good indicator of China's future exports under the WTO. 
Nevertheless, it is certain that the process ofWTO entry will accelerate the structural 
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reform of China's foreign trade. 
The accession of China into the WTO is such a comprehensive and complex issue 
that no one paper can provide an accurate assessment of all the impacts and 
consequences. This paper will therefore focus on a number of specific points based on the 
following structure. 
I. (ii) Structure of The Project 
In the rest of Section I, this paper will present an introduction to the theory of 
comparative advantage, because this is the fundamental theory for international trade. 
Also, this section will introduce the research methods used for this paper. Then, a brief 
introduction of the China-U.S. agreement will be provided in Section II. The agreement 
between China and the U.S. is the most important one among China's agreements with all 
of the other WTO member countries. Presenting the details of this agreement will provide 
a clear view and typical dimensions of China's obligations under the WTO. 
Due to the nature of China's political and economic systems, the paper will then, 
in Section III, analyze the effects of WTO entry on different economic ownership sectors 
before analyzing in Section IV, the impacts on different major industries. Section V 
identifies policy responses. The reason for giving an analysis of ownership is because of 
the conflict between the WTO framework and the Chinese economic system. Although 
the Chinese economy is in transition (from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy), it is still widely considered a "non-market economy" or a "partial market 
economy". However, the WTO framework was established on the basis of a market 
economy. It may not be an important issue when one analyzes the impacts of WTO entry 
on a market-oriented country, such as Mexico. However, it is a different scenario for 
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China. The contradiction between the two economic systems will deeply affect China's 
economic development. Thus, it is crucial to separately analyze the impacts of WTO 
entry on different ownership sectors. The last section of this project is a general 
conclusion about the effects of China's WTO entry on its economy and future 
development. 
At this stage, it is important to realize that this paper does not focus on the 
potential impacts that joining the WTO may have on Chinese consumers, the long-term 
productivity of Chinese industries, and the potential improvement of the export 
environment for China. The main task of this project rather is to analyze which industries 
are likely to benefit from the WTO, and which ones are going to face more challenges, 
and why. 
I. (ii) Theory of Comparative Advantage 
As the standard theory of international trade is based on the concept of 
comparative advantage, first described by David Ricardo (Lipsey, 1987), the analysis 
about the impacts of WTO entry on China's different industries will take the theory of 
comparative advantage as its starting point. The essential idea of comparative advantage 
is that a country will tend to export those goods that it produces relatively efficiently (or 
with higher productivity), not absolutely efficiently. More specifically, the Heckscher-
Ohlin (H-0) theorem states that a nation will export the commodities whose production 
requires the intensive use of the nation's relatively abundant factors and import the 
commodities whose production requires the intensive use of the nation's relatively scarce 
factors. In short, relatively labor-rich nations export relatively labor-intensive 
commodities and import the relatively capital-intensive commodities. This H-0 model is 
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often referred to as the factor-endowment theory (Salvatore, 1998). In this case, since 
China's factor endowments include large population, high labor-land ratios and relatively 
weak economic and technological bases, its comparative advantage tends to be in labor-
intensive industries, while its comparative disadvantage is in land-intensive, capital-
intensive, and technology-intensive industries. Thus, in moving from a relatively closed 
economy to an open economy, some industries will expand, and some will contract as 
trade increasingly reflects comparative advantage. In general, the process of integrating 
into the world economy will create expansion and more opportunities in China's light 
industries such as consumer goods, and, textile and garments. While, the agricultural 
sector, heavy, and high-tech industries will face more challenges and perhaps even 
contraction in the face of competition from their foreign counterparts. 
One point that needs to be kept in mind, however, is that comparative advantage 
is a dynamic concept in the modem economic world. The structure of comparative 
advantage itself changes over time and can be influenced by policy (Lipsey, 1987). 
Therefore, as the analysis of this paper is based on China's current structure of 
comparative advantage, the analysis of the impacts ofWTO entry on China's major 
industries can only be used in the short run. In the long run, the concept of static 
comparative advantage might lose its ground. With the development of China's economy, 
some industries will become competitive in international markets by changing their 
comparative advantage. Additionally, the central government can also create comparative 
advantage in some important industries. Some may argue that, according to China's factor 
endowments, China will never have, for example, a strong auto industry. If that was true, 
then there would be no strong auto industry in Japan and South Korea, because China's 
current dilemma in this industry is very similar to that of Japan and South Korea three or 
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four decades ago. Since Japan and South Korea have developed their auto industries 
successfully, there exists a possibility for China to have strong auto industry and other 
industries in the future. Unlike the theory of static comparative advantage, which heavily 
depends on the exogenous factor endowments of a country, dynamic comparative 
advantage is largely determined by the endogenous factors, such as a country's industrial 
policies. As a case example, during 1968 to 1976, the South Korean government 
selectively chose projects for investment with emphasis on cement, petroleum, and, iron 
and steel industries. Again, from 1977 to 1979, the Korean government allocated huge 
amounts of investment, totalling 2,806 billion won, into large-scale projects in heavy, 
auto and chemical industries (Lau and Klein, 1990). Thus, if China's central government 
provides more preferential policies and invests more in the industries that are crucial for 
China's national economy and comprehensive capacity such as the auto, the iron and 
steel, the chemical and pharmaceutical, and other high-tech industries, it is possible for 
China to create comparative advantages in these key industries. 
I. (iv) Research Methods 
Regarding the research method of this paper, as many of the existing analyses and 
resource materials available are of a qualitative rather than a quantitative focus, the paper 
will provide data analysis as well as qualitative analyses to indicate the concrete impacts 
ofWTO entry. Although exact predictions are not possible, the combination of 
quantitative data and qualitative analysis should paint a better picture of what the future 
may hold. 
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With the above as background, let us first look at the WTO agreement between 
China and the United States. 
II. The China-U.S. Agreement 
On November 15th of 1999, China unlocked the door of the WTO. The Minister of 
China's Foreign Trade Department, Shi Guangsheng, signed the first bilateral agreement 
with the representative of the U.S., Charlene Barshefsky, on China' s entry into the WTO. 
This indicated that the marathon negotiation between China and the U.S. on China' s entry 
into the world's biggest trade organization was completed, which also meant that the 
biggest obstacle for China's entry into the WTO had been eliminated. This agreement 
deals with the following sections: agricultural products, industrial products, import tariffs, 
elimination of quotas and licenses, importation and distribution rights, services, services 
auxiliary to distribution, telecommunications, insurance, banking, professional services, 
movies, tourism, negotiation item, antidumping and subsidies methodology, product 
specific safeguard, state-owned and state-invested enterprises, and textiles (UCBC, 
1999). A brief description of the contents of each of these sections is given below. 
II. (i) Agricultural Products 
The agreement requires China to permit more American agricultural products to 
enter its markets, and also requires China to lower the import tariff rate significantly 
before January 2004. At that time, the average tariff for agricultural products must be 
lowered from 31.5% to 17%, and the tariff for American agricultural priority products4 
should be lowered to 14.5%. Table 2 shows the pre- and post-agreement situations of 
China's agricultural tariffs on American priority products. 
4 The products that must be dealt with as soon as possible and before other less important products. 
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Table 2: Import Tariff Rates on American Priority Agricultural Products 
Priority Products Tariffs Pre-Agreement Tariffs Post-Agreement 
Beef 45% 12% 
Grapes 40% 13% 
Wine 65% 20% 
Cheese 50% 12% 
Poultry 20% 10% 
Pork 20% 12% 
OVERALL AVERAGE 31.5% 14.5% 
Source: http://www.uschma.org/pubhc/991115a.html 
II. (ii) Industrial Products 
China's commitments will eliminate broad systemic barriers to U.S. exports, such 
as limits on who can import goods and distribute them in China as well as barriers such as 
quotas and licenses that restrict imports of U.S. products. 
II. (iii) Import Tariffs 
China's general import tariffrate will be lowered to 9.4%; the tariff for American 
priority products will be lowered to 7.1 %. 
In the auto sector, during the accession, China will cut tariffs from the current 
80%-100% to 25% before 2006 with the largest reduction in the first few years. The tariff 
for auto parts will drop to 10% before 2006. 
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Significant cuts to tariffs will also be made in the wood and paper sectors, with 
tariffs going from present levels of 12-18% on wood and 15-25% on paper down to levels 
generally between 5% and 7.5%. 
China will also implement 0%, 5.5% and 6.5% tariffs for different categories of 
chemical products. 
II. (iv) Elimination of Quotas and Licenses 
According to the rules of the WTO, quotas and licenses are not permitted, thus 
China agrees to dismantle all quotas and licenses gradually within five years. Some 
quotas for American top priority products (e.g. fiber optic cable) will be eliminated upon 
accession. At the same time, the quotas for trade will increase 15% annually in order to 
ensure that market access increases progressively, and reduces the effect of quantitative 
restrictions. 
The auto quotas will be eliminated gradually before 2005. In the meantime, the 
base level quota will be US $6 billion (which is equivalent to the level prior to China's 
industrial auto policy in 1994) and this will grow by 15% annually until elimination. 
II. (v) Importation and Distribution Rights 
At present, China severely restricts the trade rights (import and export rights) and 
sub-distribution rights (whole sale, retail, maintenance, transportation and so on). 
According to the bilateral agreement, China will provide, for the first time, trading rights 
and distribution rights to U.S. firms within three years. Distribution rights will be 
provided even for China's most restricted distribution sectors such as wholesale, 
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transportation, maintenance and repair. 
II. (vi) Services 
China has made commitments in all major service categories with reasonable 
transitions to eliminate most foreign equity restrictions (especially in sectors where the 
U.S. has a strong commercial interest). 
II. (vii) Services Auxiliary to Distribution 
China will dismantle all the limitations in tenancy, express mail services, goods 
storage, advertising, technique inspection and analysis, and packing services within 3 to 4 
years, at which time American service suppliers can establish 100% wholly owned 
subsidiaries in China. 
II. (viii) Telecommunications 
Under present circumstances, China allows no foreign investment in 
telecommunications services. With this agreement, China will allow 49% foreign 
investment in all services, and will allow 50% foreign ownership for value added paging 
services within two years, for mobile services, 49% ownership within 5 years, and for 
international and domestic services, 49% ownership within 6 years. 
II. (ix) Insurance 
Currently, China only allows foreign insurance companies to operate in Shanghai 
and Guangzhou. After WTO entry, these regional restrictions will be eliminated within 
five years. Moreover, the operational scope will increase greatly, including collective, 
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health, and retirement pension insurance services, which account for 85% of China's total 
annual insurance income. Foreign companies can also possess 50% ownership for life 
insurance, and for non-life insurance, the share can reach 51% after two years. 
II. (x) Banking 
China has committed to full market access for American banks within five years. 
Other foreign banks will be allowed to conduct local currency business with Chinese 
enterprises after two years of the accession, and after five years this will extend to 
Chinese residents. Any regional and client restrictions for foreign banks will also be 
dismantled within five years of accession. 
II. (xi) Movies 
China agreed to import 40 movies from the U.S. immediately following WTO 
entry, and the annual number of imported American movies will be increased from 10 to 
20. 
II. (xii) Tourism 
China will allow unrestricted access to the Chinese market for hotel operators, 
with majority ownership allowed upon accession, and with the ability to set up 100% 
foreign owned hotels in 3 years. 
Foreign travel operators can provide the full range of travel agency services. For 
travel agency services, China will allow access to government resorts as well as to 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xian. 
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II. (xiii) Antidumping 
The agreed protocol provisions ensure that American firms and workers will have 
strong protection against unfair trade practices including dumping and subsidies. The 
U.S. and China have agreed that the U.S. will be able to maintain its current antidumping 
methodology (treating China as a non-market economy) in future anti-dumping cases. 
This means that Chinese industries will continue to have the burden of proving to the 
U.S. Ministry of Commerce that market economy conditions prevail in their industry to 
avoid application of the non-market economy methodology. This provision will remain in 
force for 15 years after China's accession to the WTO. 
II. (xiv) Textiles 
China's protocol package will include a provision drawn from the 1997 China-
U.S. bilateral textiles agreement, which permits U.S. companies and workers to respond 
to increased imports of textile and apparel products. This textile safeguard will be in 
effect until December 31, 2008, four years after the WTO Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing expires. 
The above discussion is drawn from the agreement between China and the United 
States. In order to join the WTO, China also has to sign agreements with all other 
members, such as Canada, the European Union (EU), Japan and so on. Nevertheless, the 
agreement with the U.S. provides a good picture of the type of impacts that can be 
expected from WTO entry for China. With this assumption made, I now turn attention to 
the impact of WTO entry on China. 
Unlike many other countries, China has relatively more diverse ownership 
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industries. It includes state-owned industry, collectively owned industry, individually 
owned industry, and, joint ventures, cooperatives and foreign-owned industry. The 
impacts on them will be quite disparate. The following section will analyze the impacts of 
WTO entry on China's different ownership industries. 
III. The Impacts of China's WTO Entry on Industries under Different Forms of 
Ownership 
Every country has some level of state-ownership, but in China political and 
historical events provide a unique context. As a result, the percentage of industrial output 
produced by state-owned industry in China's economy has historically been fairly large, 
especially before the "open door" policy (1978). However, in the past two decades the 
percentage of non-state-owned industries (collectively and individually owned industries, 
and other ownership industry5) has increased rapidly. Table 3 shows the tremendous 
change in the structure of ownership in China between 1978 and 1998. As the Table 
depicts, in 1978 state-owned industry produced 77.6% of the total national industrial 
output and collectively owned industry accounted for all of the remainder of the total 
output. In 1980, there was a slight decrease in the output of state-owned industry. 
However, the important thing was that the individually owned industry and other 
ownership industry began to perform on the economic stage, even though the output was 
very small at that time. By 1998, the percentage of output from state-owned industry had 
dropped enormously from 77.6% (1978) to 21.83%. In contrast, the output of non-state-
owned industries increased from 22.4% (1978) to 78.17%. 
5 It includes Joint Ventures, Cooperatives, and Exclusively Foreign-Owned enterprises. 
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Table 3: Industrial Output by Ownership (Billion Yuan, 1998 Price) 
Year Gross State-owned Collectively Individually Industry of 
Industry Industry Owned owned Industry Other 
Output Industry Ownership 
Value 
1978 423.7 328.9 94.8 
(77.6%) (22.4%) 
1980 515.4 391.6 121.3 0.1 2.4 
(76.0%) (23.5%) (0.02%) (0.47%) 
1985 971.6 630.2 311.7 18 11.7 
(64.86%) (32.08%) (1.85%) (1.20%) 
1990 2392.4 1306.4 852.3 129 104.7 
(54.61 %) (35.63%) (5.39%) (4.38%) 
1995 9189.4 3122 3362.3 1182.1 1523.1 
(33.97%) (36.59%) (12.86%) (16.57%) 
1998 15400.5 3362.1 4573 2037.2 5428.2 
(21.83%) (29.69%) (13.23%) (35.25%) 
Source: http:/ /www.stats.gov .cn/yearbook/1999/e08e.htm, 
http://www.cei.gov.cn/sicnet/a/db/97yearbook/1997-12-3.htm 
Additionally, in Table 4, which compares the percentage of staff with the 
percentage of output in different ownership enterprises, it can be seen that in 1998 state-
owned enterprises employed 71.41% of the total number of staff, but only produced 
21.83% of the total output. In short, about seven out often workers in China are 
employed by state-owned firms. This portion, interestingly, has not declined significantly 
during the reform period, and stands in stark contrast to the far more dramatic decline in 
the state sector's share ofnational industrial output (Steinfeld, 1999). However, for 
private enterprises (individually owned enterprises and other ownership enterprises), 
13.19% ofthe total staff produced 48.48% ofthe total output. This clearly indicates the 
great variance in efficiency between state-owned and private enterprises. 
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Table 4: Employment by Ownership in 1998 
Ownership Number of Staff Percentage (Staff) Percentage (Output) 
State-owned 88,090,000 71.41% 21.83% 
Enterprises 
Collectively Owned 19,000,000 15.40% 29.69% 
Enterprises 
Private Enterprises 16,276,300 13.19% 48.48% 
National 123,366,300 100% 100% 
Total 
Source: http://www. stats. gov. cn/yearbook/1999/ e08e.htm 
Therefore, there is no doubt that due to the different situations, the impacts of 
WTO entry will differ among different ownership sectors in China. 
III. (i) State-Owned Industrial Enterprises 
Although the non-state economy has increased remarkably in China during the 
past two decades, state-owned enterprises still account for more than 20% of China's 
GDP and two-thirds of urban employment. In some sectors, such as food processing, 
textiles, electronics, iron and steel, machinery, chemical, and auto manufacture, state-
owned enterprises dominate or completely control these industries (Stiglitz, 1997). 
Therefore, the impacts of China's WTO entry will have significant effects on state-owned 
enterprises. 
Presently, without formal WTO membership, or in other words with some level of 
protection, the performance of the state-owned enterprise sector is not satisfactory. 
Steinfeld (1999) reported that, in 1985,9.6% of state-owned industrial enterprises 
declared losses amounting to 2.7 billion yuan (US $0.33 billion). Ten years later, 44% of 
such firms were declaring losses, and losses had risen to 40.9 billion yuan (US $4.93 
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billion). In 1996, China officially acknowledged that the state-owned industrial sector as 
a whole had posted net losses for the year, the first time this had happened since 1949. 
The four major reasons for the losses are the redundant labor force, heavy burden of 
social responsibilities, low productivity and lack of incentives for profit maximization (or 
cost minimization) in state-owned enterprises, which eventually increase the costs of 
production. 
As mentioned before, the portion of workers employed by stat-owned firms has 
not changed much during the reform period. The reason for this is that China uses a 
permanent employment system ("iron rice bowl") in all state-owned enterprises 
(Naughton, 1995). Consequently, this permanent employment system leads to the 
following serious problems. Firstly, state-owned enterprises have accumulated large, 
unfunded pension liabilities. The World Bank estimated that pension debt in the mid-
1990s was equal to about 50% of China's GDP (Lardy, 1998). Secondly, state-owned 
enterprises carry a heavy burden for the annual construction of residential housing. For 
instance, in 1995, half of all new housing provided for urban residents was built by state-
owned firms, and the area of state-owned apartments was increased from 116 million 
square meters in 1985 to 177 million square meters (Lardy, 1998). Moreover, these state-
owned apartments are sold below cost, which means enterprises are still burdened by 
having to pay interest on the loans taken out to finance the initial construction. The rents 
paid by workers, sometimes, do not even cover the cost of maintaining the buildings. 
Thirdly, state-owned enterprises also have to cover the cost of education and health care. 
Lardy (1998) argues that, in the mid-1990s, state-owned enterprises operated more than 
18,000 schools with an enrollment of 6.1 million students, employing a total of 600,000 
teachers and other staff. Hospitals built and run by state-owned firms accounted for one-
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third of all hospital beds in China. Evidently, all of these growing expenditures on social 
responsibilities substantially increase the cost of state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, 
these social responsibilities distract the management of the state-owned firms from the 
single-minded focus on efficient production that western competitors have, and also 
hobble the enterprises from firing workers (Overholt, 1993). Thus, all these social 
burdens placed upon Chinese state-owned firms seriously influence their economic 
performances. 
Regarding productivity, Table 5 shows that, generally, the productivity growth 
rate of state-owned enterprises is only half, or less than half, of the other ownership 
enterprises. 
Table 5: Estimated Rates of Annual Productivity Growth in Chinese Industry 
1980-1984 1984-1988 1988-1992 
Total factor productivity 
State sector 1.8 3.0 2.5 
Urban and township 3.4 5.9 4.9 
Township-Village 7.3 6.6 6.9 
Labor productivity 
State sector 3.8 6.2 4.7 
Urban and township 8.6 7.0 13.8 
Source: http://www.gwu.edu/~econ270/Nonko .htm 
Since 1997, the central government began gradually laying off workers in state-
owned enterprises across China in order to achieve profitability. By 2000, 6.3 million 
workers or 8.8% ofthe total number of state-owned enterprises workers had been laid off 
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(xiagang) (Kagawa, 1998). However, large losses still continue. The central government 
realized that the redundancy of workers is not the only factor causing losses. They 
assumed that some problems, such as the lack of incentive for profit maximization or cost 
minimization, could be solved only by privatization (Nolan and Dong, 1990). Therefore, 
in the early 2001 , the central government decided to privatize all state-owned enterprises 
in Guangdong province to test this hypothesis6 . If the result is satisfactory, the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises will be applied to the entire country. 
However, the reform for state-owned enterprises cannot be accomplished 
overnight; little time is left for reform before China's WTO entry. Therefore, it is 
unavoidable that state-owned enterprises will suffer more losses and face more challenges 
from WTO entry. For example, even the most advanced and largest industrial city, 
Shanghai, cannot completely avoid the negative impacts ofWTO entry. Xu (1996) 
estimated that, after entering the WTO, 422 of 1,074 state-owned industrial enterprises 
(39% of the total) would have large reduction in their market shares. In terms of products, 
206 of the 286 kinds of major products (72% of the total) will sustain market losses. 
However, the remaining one-third of industries in Shanghai will be free from any 
negative effects due to their early openness and relatively stronger industrial base. If this 
is a likely consequence in Shanghai after WTO entry, then many other cities that do not 
have as good an industrial bases and capacity as Shanghai will experience more serious 
impacts on state-owned enterprises. Hence, it is foreseeable that after entering the WTO, 
the reduction of the import tariff and the cancellation of non-tariff import restrictions, 
will increase the number and percentage of bad-performing state-owned enterprises. 
6 Retrieved from the broadcast of China's Central Television. 
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In fact, the performance of state-owned enterprises after 1978 has been varied. 
Some state-owned enterprises are losing competitive power and being removed out of the 
market gradually, whereas some are becoming stronger and stronger. As an example of 
the latter, currently Haier is one of China's top producers of electronic products. Sixteen 
years ago, it was a small factory that was 1.4 7 million yuan (US $0.18 million) in debt, 
yet, after only two decades, it has become a big enterprise group. By the end of 1999, 
Haier produced 9,200 electronic products, and total income was 21.5 billion yuan (US 
$2.59 billion). Moreover its annual growth rate is 81 .6% in the last twenty years. In the 
first four months of2000, it already had met its yearly export target. Currently, Haier's 
products are very popular in Europe, and supply often falls short of demand (Haier, 
2000). In fact, there are a number of other state-owned enterprises running as well as 
Haier in China, such as Meidi, Changhong, and Little Swan. WTO entry will certainly 
benefit these enterprises. On the one hand, they can import foreign materials at lower 
cost, and on the other hand, they will also be assured of access to other countries' 
markets, and expand their exports and production scales. 
Nevertheless, most of China's state-owned enterprises have not achieved the 
success of Haier, Meidi, Changhong, and Little Swan. They are not ready for competition 
with their foreign counterparts. Therefore, in general, state-owned industries collectively 
will suffer severe impacts, at least in the short term. 
III. (ii) Collectively Owned Industrial Enterprises 
In China, there are both urban collectively owned and rural collectively owned 
enterprises. The urban collectives are more like state-owned enterprises in terms of the 
management system, budget constraints, scale, technological capacity and operations. 
25 
Additionally, they were established at the same time as state-owned enterprises. 
However, the rural collectives have been formally established and developed after 1978, 
when China began to its economic reforms. In this section this paper will focus only on 
the analysis of the rural collectively owned enterprises, and the phrase "collectively 
owned enterprises" is used hereafter to refer only to China's rural collectively owned 
enterprises. 
Although collectively owned enterprises do not have the same capital and 
technological capacity as many state-owned enterprises, collectively owned enterprises, 
such as many village and township enterprises are relatively more flexible due to their 
small economic scale, better management system, harder budget constraints, and their 
operation outside of the national economic plan. These businesses operate mainly 
according to the rules of a market economy and the central government seldom intervenes 
in their operations (because they are not the properties of the state) (Nolan and Dong, 
1990). As a result, they perform more efficiently than state-owned enterprises. From 
Table 4, it can be calculated that in 1998 the staff in collectively owned enterprises was 
only 21.57% that of state-owned enterprises, while the output of collectively owned 
enterprises was 1.36 times that of state-owned firms. Evidently, collectively owned 
enterprises have an advantage in efficiency compared to state-owned enterprises. 
Furthermore, "most of their products are labor-intensive, such as medium- and low-grade 
textiles and light industrial products" (Xu, 1996, p.117), which allow the collectively 
owned enterprises to make best use of their comparative advantage. Therefore, China's 
entry into the WTO will have far less of an impact on collectively owned industrial 
enterprises than on state-owned industrial enterprises. In addition, the collectively owned 
economic sector is in the process of all-round development and privatization, and its role 
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in the national economy has grown from 1978 to 1995 in terms of the percentage of 
output value. This can be supported by looking at Table 3. Although from 1995 to 1998 
the percentage dropped by about 7%, this was mainly due to the tremendous increase in 
other ownership industry (from 16.57% to 35.25%). In general, collectively owned 
enterprises still constitute a high percentage of China' s national GDP. 
Another important point is that many collectively owned enterprises are becoming 
export oriented. A number of them have already established cooperative relations with 
foreign companies. Those foreign companies usually provide designs, brands, and 
sometimes materials, and these collectively owned enterprises produce the products 
according to their foreign business partners' requirements. Then, eventually, foreign 
companies buy back the products and sell them in international markets. This kind of 
business and production link is very suitable for Chinese collectively owned enterprises, 
because even when China joins the WTO and opens the market to intensive foreign 
competition, these enterprises will still sustain low risks due to their incorporation into 
global production chains. In addition, as the central government lowers the import tariff, 
the collectively owned enterprises will be able to obtain cheaper foreign materials for 
their production. At the same time, as a benefit of joining the WTO, the products of these 
collectively owned enterprises would be assured of access to foreign markets more easily 
than before. Therefore, at this point, collectively owned industrial enterprises will benefit 
from WTO entry, and the negative impacts are limited. 
III. (iii) Individual Industrial Enterprises 
China's individual economy has developed rapidly during the last two decades. It 
has demonstrated the vitality of the profit motive (Young, 1995). As Table 3 indicates, 
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the total output increased by 20,372 times from 100 million yuan (US $12.06 million) in 
1980 to 2,037.2 billion yuan (US $245.74 billion) in 1998. At the same time, the 
percentage of individual enterprises' output in China's total industrial output rose from a 
minimal level of0.02% to 13.23%. All ofthese data show that China's individual 
economy has become an important component of the national economy and a source of 
economic growth since 1978. 
The current situation of individual industrial enterprises is basically the same as 
collectively owned enterprises. However, as their property right is more concentrated, 
they are more flexible than collectively owned enterprises in mechanism and operation. 
In addition, due to their relatively smaller scale, and weaker capital and technological 
capacities, these individual industrial enterprises mainly operate in the labor-intensive 
tertiary industries closely related to people's life such as commerce, catering, service and 
repair industries. For instance, by the end of 1999, 82.22% of the individual enterprises 
were engaged in the tertiary industry (CIFIT, 1998). 
Generally, because the level of international exchange of service goods lags far 
behind the level of international exchange in manufactured goods, future competition in 
the tertiary industry is not as intense as in the primary and secondary industries. Also, the 
individual enterprises are much more flexible and perform more efficiently than state-
owned and collectively owned enterprises. Therefore, they can adapt to the new 
competitive environment more quickly and easily after WTO entry. 
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III. (iv) Joint Ventures, Cooperatives, and Exclusively Foreign-Owned Industrial 
Enterprises 
During more than two decades of openness, joint ventures, cooperatives and 
exclusively foreign-owned enterprises have developed greatly in China. Currently, with 
the expansion of foreign investment, foreign-funded enterprises are playing an important 
role in the national economy. For instance, in 1999, foreign-funded firms generated 
20.7% of industrial added value, and their output growth rate was higher than the national 
average growth rate (7.1 %) (Muo, 1999). Their tax payments made up 16% of the 
national total tax revenue in 1999, five percentage points higher than at the end of the 
Eighth Five-Year Plan period (1991-95). Exports and imports of foreign-funded 
enterprises rose from 39.1% ofthe national total in 1995 to 50.8% in 1999. Moreover, by 
the end of 1999, the number of employees in foreign-funded enterprises exceeded 20 
million, accounting for about 10% ofthe labor force in urban areas (Muo, 1999). The 
focus of foreign direct investment at this moment is China's auto, electronic, drink, and, 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Despite their sizeable share of the import and 
export markets, foreign participation in other Chinese industries remains so low as to be 
insignificant. For instance, in 1998, they accounted for only 0.5% of the total output 
value of agricultural sector, 4% of the transportation and communications sectors, and 
3% of the retail sector (Chinaonline, 1998). 
After WTO entry, foreign invested enterprises will be given national treatment in 
domestic markets according to the rules of the WTO. This implies that foreign invested 
companies can have further shares in, and enter most of, China's markets. Moreover, 
since foreign funded companies will be treated in the same way as Chinese domestic 
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enterprises, their materials and labor costs will be cheaper than before. Additionally, 
many government tariffs and fees will also be eliminated. All of this, together with 
foreign funded enterprises' strong capital and technological capacities, will provide high 
productivity and low production cost for the foreign invested enterprises. As a result, 
their products will be more competitive in both domestic and international markets. 
Therefore, it is probable that in the short term, the greatest benefit from China's entry into 
the WTO will be to foreign-funded enterprises. 
The impacts of China's WTO entry will not only vary among different ownership 
sectors, but also among different sectors of the Economy. Whereas, some sectors will 
benefit more from the opportunities that the WTO membership provides, others will face 
more challenges. In the following section, this paper analyzes the impacts of WTO entry 
on some selected sectors; these sectors are chosen because of the important roles they 
play in the Chinese economy. These sectors are agriculture, the machinery and electrical 
equipment industry, the iron and steel industry, the auto industry, the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries, the textile and garments industry, the consumer goods 
industry, the finance industry, and the telecommunications industry. 
IV. The Impacts and Opportunities of China's WTO Entry on Different Sectors 
As a developing country, the opening of domestic markets is bound to have large 
impacts on China's domestic industries and economic sectors. There will be both positive 
and negative results. WTO entry entails membership in a global trading system and 
increased linkages with the rest of the world economy. This will provide a potential 
opportunity to shape China's trade structure to fit its comparative advantage and to 
promote overall economic growth. At the same time, however, China' s domestic markets 
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will be opened to foreign firms. Domestic industries will be exposed to increasing foreign 
competition. Since the degrees of development, openness and internationalization in 
different sectors vary, the impacts and results will be quite varied too. 
IV. (i) Agriculture 
CURRENT SITUATION: 
Since China is still a predominantly agricultural country, with agricultural output 
accounting for about one third of GDP, agriculture is one of the most important sectors of 
China's economy. The current degree of internationalization of China' s agriculture is very 
limited. Therefore, the agricultural sector will face more challenges than opportunities at 
the early stage of liberalization. 
From the process of China's entry into the WTO, one can see that negotiation in 
agriculture is one of the most difficult fields. The reason for China taking agriculture as a 
key object for protection is that agriculture is a very crucial sector in China's national 
economy and important for social stability. The output of this sector counts for a 
relatively higher percentage ofGDP in China compared to developed countries. For 
instance, in 1998, 30.88% ofthe GDP was derived from the agricultural sector (NBS, 
1999). Conversely, in the U.S. , only 1.43% ofthe GDP derived from agriculture in 1998 
(BEA, 2000). Additionally, there are 500 million farmers living in China. They make up 
two-thirds of the labor force (Qin, 2000). 
Since agriculture represents the foundation of China's national economy and 
social stability, many import barriers have been created to protect it. As mentioned in 
Section II (i), the present average nominal import tariff rate of agriculture is 31 .5% in 
China. However, even under the high degree of protection associated with other non-
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tariff measures, the import value of agricultural products is still remarkable. According to 
data from the Ministry ofForeign Trade & Economic Cooperation, in 1999 the import 
value of agricultural products was US $4.986 billion (MOFTEC, 2000). 
THE IMPACT: 
After China joins the WTO, there will be two main impacts on China' s 
agriculture. One is from the WTO's agriculture framework. In this framework, all the 
members are required to achieve free agricultural trade. Currently, few, if any, countries 
conform to free trade in agriculture, and even the U.S. and the E.U. are providing large 
subsidies to their agricultural sectors. However, in accordance with the aim of the WTO, 
China is going to gradually move in the direction of freer agricultural trade, as have other 
WTO member countries. This will result in changes in international prices, international 
trade patterns, market openness, and the rules of agricultural trade (People's Daily, 2000). 
All of these changes will certainly affect international agricultural markets and the 
development of the whole world's agriculture. With the deepening internationalization of 
China's agriculture, it is impossible to avoid these influences. 
The other impact is from the obligations that China has promised in the 
agricultural negotiations. The negative impacts will be detailed as follows: 
Firstly, the domestic agricultural sector will face severe pressure from the falling 
import tariff rate. According to the agricultural agreement, China has to decrease the 
average tariff rate on agriculture from 31.5% to 14.5% (Zhao, 1999). This will definitely 
impact Chinese farmers. For example, at present, China imports two million tons of 
wheat from the U.S. annually. However, after WTO entry, this is expected to reach five 
million tons due to the lower import costs. For Chinese wheat farmers, this means a US 
$651 million income loss every year (Zhao, 1999). If we consider other agricultural 
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products, such as meat, com, and oranges, the loss in agricultural income will be 
tremendous. It is estimated that due to the opening of domestic markets, the decline in the 
domestic production of wheat, rice, com, cotton, and soy sauce will result in a loss of 
about 20.9 million to 25.5 million jobs in the long term (Chen, 2000). 
Secondly, the cancellation of non-tariff measures will impact Chinese agriculture 
further. In the past, China not only used tariffs but also applied import quotas, licenses, 
and other non-tariff measures to limit agricultural importation and to protect domestic 
agriculture. However, according to the agricultural agreement of the WTO, in the near 
future, all the members should only impose tariff measures to limit the importation of 
agricultural products, and any non-tariff measures will no longer be allowed. In fact, for a 
long time, non-tariff measures were the most important ways of protecting China's 
agriculture. The change of the pattern of import limitation implies that China will 
gradually open its agricultural products market according to the international rules. This 
also means domestic markets will face tremendous impacts and challenges from 
international markets. 
Thirdly, with the reduction in trade protection, the low price advantage of China's 
agricultural products will be gradually decreased or even disappear. Moreover, due to the 
partial removal of input subsidies, and the increase in the general price level and wage 
rates, the prices of agricultural products are increasing dramatically. For instance, in 
1994, the price of foodstuffs increased 51.4%, and in 1995 it increased again by 48.7%. 
The prices of some main agricultural products (such as staple foodstuffs) are already 
above the prices in international markets of recent years. For example, "at the end of 
1995, the prices of rice, wheat, and com were 9%, 15% and 57% respectively above the 
prices in international markets" (Muo, 2000, p.1 03). However, foreign competitive 
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agricultural products will lower the prices of agricultural products in the domestic 
markets. Consequently, it will reduce the farmers' income, and reduce their investment in 
agriculture. At least in short term, this will have a negative influence on China's 
agriculture. 
It needs to be pointed out that although the negative effects on agriculture are 
obvious and severe, it does not mean that foreign agricultural products will absolutely 
dominate China's agricultural markets. It is possible to minimize the negative impacts, as 
long as China acts in accordance with developing countries' obligations and adopts 
reasonable regulations. In addition, entering into the WTO also provides hard-won 
opportunities for the development of China's agricultural sector. Some areas can even 
benefit directly from WTO entry according to the comparative advantage that China's 
agricultural sector has. Although Chinese farmers on small plots of land cannot compete 
with Americans on big farms, they may switch from resource-intensive or land-intensive 
agriculture to labor-intensive agriculture, such as fruits, vegetables and processed foods 
(Crook, 1998). There will be some opportunities there, especially for farmers in eastern 
China. For example, the prices of Chinese plant oil, sugar, fruits and vegetables are 40% 
to 70% cheaper than the prices in international markets (Lu, 1999). Hence, the export 
income in these fields may increase enormously with China's entry into the WTO. 
There are some other positive aspects. As a member of the WTO, in the early 
stage of the accession, China will have the right to use some relevant items in the 
agreement to protect domestic products and markets. Additionally, China can also 
directly attend international agricultural negotiations, maintaining developing countries' 
interests, and keeping the few developed countries' unilateral behavior and trade 
protection within limits. For example, in the Uruguay Round, Japan and South Korea 
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were forced by the pressure of other member countries to open their rice markets. 
However, as a non-member of the WTO, China currently still has no right to export rice 
to Japan and South Korea. This is because the U.S. and other rice export countries argued 
that since the openness of the rice markets of Japan and South Korea was achieved in the 
Uruguay Round, only member countries of the WTO have the right to export rice to these 
two countries. However, should China join the WTO, this restriction will be lifted. At the 
same time, being a member of the WTO, other countries non-tariff measures on the 
exports of Chinese agricultural products will be reduced or dismantled. This, no doubt, 
will promote China's exports in agricultural products and increase its share in 
international markets. Muo (2000, p.lOl) also reported that, "after the Uruguay Round, 
developed countries have reduced their protection levels and increased the quantity of 
market admittance". For instance, developed countries have lowered 37% of their import 
tariffs on agricultural products. Some products such as flowers, vegetables, rapeseed, and 
com have more than a 40% reduction in import tariffs. Therefore, these areas will present 
many opportunities for the expansion of China's agricultural exports. 
IV. (ii). Heavy Industries 
The following selected heavy industries, such as the machinery and electrical 
equipment industry, the iron and steel industry, the auto industry, and the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries, are pillar industries7 in China's economy. Each of these 
industries produces more than 5% of China's GDP. Furthermore, the total import and 
export value of these industries accounts for more than 50% of the national foreign trade 
7 Pillar industries are the ones that have crucial influences to a country's economic development. 
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value. Although this paper does not analyze all the heavy industries in China, the analysis 
of selected heavy industries will cover the basic structure of this economic sector, and 
will also provide a typical overview ofthe future development of China's heavy 
industries under the WTO system. 
1. The Machinery and Electrical Equipment Industry 
CURRENT SITUATION: 
The rapid growth of China's industrial sector in recent years has led to a 
continually increasing demand for machinery products. In 1997, the total output value of 
machinery and electrical equipment industry was 460.49 billion yuan (US $55.55 billion), 
accounting for 6.16% ofGDP. The total import and export value ofmachinery products 
in 1997 was US $103.71 billion, which accounted for 35.1% ofthe total national import 
and export value in that year (Muo, 1999). All of these data indicate that the machinery 
industry is a key industry for China's economic development. In addition, due to its 
important position in the chain of production, the performance of this industry will affect 
other industries' performances directly or indirectly. 
THE IMPACT: 
There is no doubt that WTO entry will help deepen the reform of the machinery 
and electrical equipment industry, accelerate the transformation of corporate 
organization, and improve the export environment for machinery and electrical products. 
Also, it will facilitate the introduction of foreign technology and capital to enhance this 
industry's capacity to compete in international markets. However, the impacts of entering 
the WTO on this industry are varied. In the past, the machinery and electrical equipment 
industry was considered a key industry and was given priority for development with a 
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high degree of government protection. This protection effectively helped China establish 
and develop this industry, while at the same time, it also limited both the domestic and 
foreign competition, slowed down the technical improvement, and eventually produced a 
large number oflow-efficiency enterprises. As Xu (1996, p.119) pointed out, "China's 
current overall level of technology in the machinery and electrical equipment industry is 
behind the international level by about 10-20 years". In Shanghai, China's most advanced 
industrial base, only 7.3% of its machinery and electrical products have a technological 
quality equal to the international level of the mid-1980s, 42.6% have the quality of the 
1970s, and 50% ofthe 1960s. 
Because of the backward technology and obsolete equipment, China's machinery 
and electrical equipment industry has much lower productivity than developed countries. 
Even though Chinese machinery and electrical products are cheaper (largely due to the 
low labor cost) than foreign counterparts, in this case the level of technology and the 
quality of a product play the dominant roles in competing with other countries. As a 
result, China's machinery industry will suffer greatly and for the longest period of all 
industries, following China's WTO accession (CTC, 2000). This, nevertheless, does not 
mean that this industry will have no any opportunity after WTO entry. In fact, being a 
WTO member, China can expand its export of the standardized machinery products 
(which involve relatively less technology) to many developing countries that are also 
members of the WTO. According to the WTO agreement, China will be able to access 
their markets much more easily than before. On the other hand, with the increase of 
international cooperation under the WTO system, this industry will enjoy opportunities of 
attracting more foreign capital for its technological enhancement, and gaining a good 
position in international division of production. However, in the short and medium term 
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China's machinery and electrical equipment industry will focus mainly on the normal 
standardized machinery and equipment production. 
2. The Iron and Steel Industry 
CURRENT SITUATION: 
The iron and steel industry is another pillar industry in China. It plays a large role 
in the national economy. This industry has achieved rapid progress since the 1980s, with 
steel output topping 100 million tons in 1996 (Chinaonline, 2000). In Table 6, one can 
see that since 1997 China has been the number one 
Table 6: The Outputs of Iron and Steel 
Ranking Country 1997 1998 1999 
(MioMT) (Mio MT) (Mio MT) 
1 China 107.9 114.1 123.7 
2 USA 96.7 97.4 97.3 
3 Japan 104.5 93.5 94.2 
4 Russia 46.0 43 .8 51.5 
Source: http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/sc/000903.htm 
producer (in terms of quantity) ofiron and steel in the world. From January to July of 
2000, the import value of steel products was US $3.56 billion, and the export value was 
US $5.90 billion. The total amount of import and export value of this period accounted 
for 1% of the 1998 GDP. Although great progress has been achieved in terms of both 
output and value, the technology, equipment, product variety and quality, and especially 
labor productivity of China's iron and steel industry are far behind the world's level. Most 
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of China's steel factories are not as efficient as foreign steel producers. Table 7 shows the 
average labor productivity of a steel worker from major steel making countries. 
Table 7: Labor Productivities of Iron and Steel Industry (1996) 
Unit: ton/person, year World average Australia Japan Korea u.s. India China 
Productivity (1996) 182 681 637 585 398 78 32 
Source: http://www.tdctrade.com/econforurn!sc/000903.htm 
The labor productivity of a Chinese worker is only 4.7% of an Australian steel 
worker (the most efficient one in the Table). Even compared to the world average level, 
China only reaches 17.6%. In addition, the small scale of most enterprises is also a key 
factor that makes most Chinese iron and steel companies uncompetitive. For instance, in 
2000 there were 290 steel factories in China. However, only the top 8 of them produced 
more than 3 million tons of steel (which is considered the minimum economic scale for 
steel companies), 46 of them produced about 500,000 tons a year, and the output of the 
other 236 factories only accounted for 13% of the total output in this industry, which is 
about 50,000 tons for each factory (HKTDC, 2000). The unbalanced situation in this 
industry also explains the contradiction between the large exports and the low average 
productivity. In fact, nearly 100% ofthe export value ofthis industry is derived from the 
top 8 factories in China. 
THE IMPACT: 
At present, "the average tariff rate on steel among members of the WTO is about 
15%, while in China the import tariff rate on the products ofthis industry is about 22.5%" 
(Muo, 2000, p.325). This means that after entering into the WTO, China has to decrease 
its tariff rate by 7.5%; furthermore, import limitations will no longer be allowed. Thus, 
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those high cost, low quality iron and steel products, especially those products whose price 
is much above foreign products' prices will face intense challenges and competition. For 
example, as the technology of domestic iron and steel enterprises lags far behind foreign 
competitors, the current price of stainless steel in domestic market is 20% higher than in 
international markets (Muo, 1999). Therefore, when China's import tariff rate on iron and 
steel is lowered from 22.5% to 15% after WTO accession, foreign stainless steel will 
have a 5% (20%-15%) advantage in this market. 
As the comparative advantage will finally be represented by price, it can be 
concluded that, in general, the comparative advantage of China's iron and steel industry is 
in the normal, standardized (and hence labor-intensive products such as ordinary large, 
medium and small sections, cold roll steels, and medium plates. On the other hand, the 
comparative disadvantage is in the high-end and high-tech products, such as silicon 
sheets, seamless pipes, stainless sheets, welded pipes, oilfield pipes, zinc-coated sheets, 
sin-coated sheets and high-pressure furnace pipes (HKTDC, 2000). 
3. The Auto Industry 
CURRENT SITUATION: 
The auto industry in China is not a new industry and has a 40-year history. The 
Chinese government places a high priority on developing a domestic auto industry. 
Currently, the average tariff on auto products is 55%- the highest of all of China's 
industries (Zhu, 2000). Among these high import tariff rates, as one can see from Table 8, 
the highest tariff is on sedans. Because China's sedan industry is still developing, tariffs 
on these cars are between 80-100%. This is also the highest tariff rate among China's 
industrial products. The high rates of import tariffs associated with other non-tariff 
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barriers have made it possible for China to gradually develop its own auto industry. When 
the People's Republic of China was first established, there was no single domestic-made 
automobile. However, in 1998, China produced 1.63 million cars and trucks, 2.9 million 
agricultural vehicles, and 8.29 million motorcycles (GSFTC, 2000). 
Table 8: Import Tariff Rates on Vehicles and Parts (2000) 
Product Type Tariff Rate 
Sedan 80-100% 
Major Parts 40-50% 
Electronic Parts 12-25% 
Tires 22% 
Source: 
http://www.chinaonline.com/industry/automotive/NewsArchive/Secure/2000/February/B 
1 00021528-SS.asp 
Although great progress has been achieved, China's auto industry is still far 
behind developed countries' general level. Its technology is backward, the production 
scale is very small, and there is limited product variety. To be more detailed, in 
technology, the auto industry is at the same level that developed countries were at in the 
1980's. At present, domestic made automobiles are about 10%-20% heavier than their 
foreign counterparts, and consume 10%-30% more fuel; moreover, the life ofthe 
products is just half of foreign automobiles (Muo, 2000). In production scale, not only 
does the output value of auto industry constitute a relatively small proportion of China's 
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national economy, but the whole industry is spread over more than two thousand 
enterprises (Muo, 2000). Among them, only 120 factories can produce complete vehicles, 
600 factories remodel vehicles, and about 2000 factories produce components and spare 
parts (Xu, 1996). According to Muo's (1999) research, in order to achieve economy of 
scale, an auto factory should produce at least two million vehicles per year. However, in 
China there is no single factory that can reach this scale. Without this scale, original R & 
D (Research and Development) is nearly impossible, and says nothing of international 
competition. Furthermore, due to its backward technology and small production scale, the 
price of domestic cars is 200% or even 300% higher than those of the same type of car in 
international markets (Tong, 1999). 
THE IMPACT: 
With membership of the WTO, tariff and non-tariff protection will eventually be 
reduced and dismantled in this industry. The WTO agreement requires that by the end of 
2005 China's import tariff on auto products should be lowered to 25%. Since Chinese 
auto products are 2 or 3 times more expensive than foreign counterparts, this 25% import 
tariff rate will not be able to protect the domestic auto industry effectively. At that time, 
cheaper and more advanced foreign sedan cars and other types of vehicles will easily rush 
into domestic market. At present, China's vehicle registration has reached a total of 10 
million, including 2.3 million cars. However, after WTO entry, the number of cars alone 
is expected to reach 15 million by 2010. In addition, annual demand that is currently 
700,000 units is expected to reach 1.2 to 1.6 million cars a few years after WTO entry 
(Corporate Information, 2000). For consumers, this really is good news; however, for 
domestic auto manufacturers, this means intense competition. Consequently, many 
domestic small auto factories will be forced to shut down or merge. Therefore, the 
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number of domestic auto factory will decrease dramatically, and the production scale of 
each major manufacturer will increase in order to adapt the new market environment after 
WTO accession. 
However, one should realize that opening this market would also provide China 
with many opportunities to cooperate with advanced foreign auto companies. Even now 
before China's entry into the WTO some of the foreign companies, such as Audi, 
Peugeot, and Volkswagen, are playing important roles in the development of China's 
auto industry. Incidentally, the number of these companies is increasing continually: In 
early 1999, Honda and GM opened their new factories in Guangzhou and Shanghai 
respectively to produce the latest types of sedan cars. Why do foreign auto companies 
build factories instead of exporting vehicles to China? Firstly, China has the largest 
potential market for the auto industry. For example, vehicle ownership density in the 
United States is 785 vehicles/1 000 people, while in China it is about 10 vehicles/1 000 
people (Walsh, 1999). The second reason for building factories in China is the low labor 
cost. The author estimated that the general wage rate of Chinese auto workers is about 
10% ofthat of American workers. Thirdly, China imposes very high import tariff rates 
(about 100%) on foreign vehicles. In order to avoid these high tariffs, direct investment is 
the only choice. However, after China enters the WTO, foreign auto companies may 
reconsider their decision to investment. China has already promised to lower the average 
import tariff rate on vehicles to 25% instead ofthe previous 80-100%. Foreign auto 
companies will compare the productivities in their own countries to the productivity of 
this industry in China. If the difference in the productivities is less than 25%, then the 
motivation for direct investment still exists. However, if the difference in productivity is 
greater than 25%, China's WTO entry might have a negative impact on direct foreign 
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investment in the auto industry. 
One point that needs to be mentioned is that Chinese joint venture auto companies 
will maintain their competitiveness after WTO entry. Since these joint venture companies 
have advanced western technologies and cheaper Chinese workers, the combination of 
these two factors will provide their products with strong market competitiveness, 
especially in China's domestic market. The reason is that compared to the products of 
state-owned auto manufacturers and imported foreign vehicles, the products of the joint 
venture auto companies have a higher quality to price ratio. However, the disadvantage is 
that all of these joint ventures are currently operating relatively small production scales. 
For example, the production scale of Shanghai GM Company was only 100,000 units in 
1998 (Autofan, 2001), and the scale ofGuangzhou Honda Automobile Company was 
only 30,000 units in 1999 (HMC, 2001). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that after China's entry into the WTO, these joint venture 
auto companies will narrow the gap between China and western countries in this field. 
With their large amount of capital, high technology, advanced management system and 
China's relatively cheaper labor resource, the irrational structure of China's auto industry 
will change and gradually disappear. At that time, thousands of small factories will either 
shut down or be merged into a few large auto manufacturers. In the future, it is 
reasonable to believe that the cars made in China will become competitive, and China 
might gradually establish a comparative advantage in this industry. 
4. The Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries 
CURRENT SITUATION: 
The development of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries is closely related 
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to the development of the national economy. Such development is dependent upon 
scientific and technological progress. China's chemical and pharmaceutical industries 
have developed under the planned economic structure and the protection of high tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers for nearly 50 years. This has led to the following problems: 
Product variety is very limited, quality and performance are poor, production scale is also 
small, technology and equipment are backward, labor productivity is low, and material 
consumption is large. In 1993, the output value of the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries accounted for 6. 7% of China's total industrial output value. In order to meet the 
needs of rapid economic development and people's daily consumption, China has had to 
rely on large amounts of imports, and these imports have increased dramatically in recent 
years. For example, by 1996, imported products accounted for 12% of domestic market, 
and imported chemical fiber accounted for over 34% of domestic demand (Xu, 1996). In 
light of the above factors, it is apparent that, without entering into the WTO (which 
means without completely opening China's chemical markets), it has become fairly 
difficult for domestic industry to meet the market demand. 
THE IMPACT: 
According to the WTO agreement, China's import tariff on the chemical industry 
will be lowered from the current average of 10.2% to 5.5% or 6.5% immediately after 
WTO entry (Industry Canada, 1999). With a nearly 50% reduction in the import tariff 
rate and the cancellation of non-tariff measures, China's chemical industry will face 
severe challenges. 
However, the fatal weakness of the chemical industry, especially the 
pharmaceutical industry, lies in its long-term reliance on the imitation of foreign 
products. Xu (1996) argued that in Shanghai over 97% of medicine, 95% of pesticides, 
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over 50% of chemical reagents, 66% of plastic products, and 80% of dyes are imitations. 
After WTO accession, these products will certainly face very strong competition. 
Accordingly, China will have to abide by the agreement of intellectual property rights 
and patents protection. In essence, China's pharmaceutical industry will no longer be able 
to imitate foreign products on a large scale. The chemical and pharmaceutical industries 
should turn to original research, development, and manufacture of products. In general, 
the foreign lower price of chemical products and higher quality of pharmaceutical 
products will affect these industries significantly. 
Chemical and pharmaceutical industries are also facing some opportunities. 
Although many state-owned enterprises are going to experience intense foreign 
competition after WTO accession due to their disadvantages in the variety, the quality 
and the price of their products, Chinese joint venture chemical and pharmaceutical 
enterprises are going to enjoy more opportunities. In fact, the chemical industry was one 
of the first Chinese industries opened to the outside world, and joint ventures currently 
make up 20% of the total output value of this industry, focusing mainly on the cosmetics, 
detergents, perfume and essence, battery, and pharmaceutical industries (Chinaonline, 
2000). Like the auto industry, these joint venture chemical enterprises also have 
advantages in both technology and labor costs. With the advantage in the quality and 
price of their products, they are capable of competing with international name brands. It 
is unlikely that imported products will have significant impacts on them after WTO entry. 
On the contrary, many products of these joint ventures already have good shares in 
international markets. For instance, at present China's regular zinc-manganese battery is 
exported to more than 100 countries and regions (Chinaonline, 2000). 
Furthermore, entering into the WTO will force Chinese chemical and 
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pharmaceutical industries to make reforms in the industrial structure, and remove those 
low level, low quality, high cost and small-scale enterprises. In addition, WTO entry 
offers China an opportunity to establish relevant laws and regulations to assure the safety 
and quality of the products in the pharmaceutical industry. 
IV. (iii) Light Industries 
1. The Textile and Garments Industry 
CURRENT SITUATION: 
The textile and garments industry is another pillar industry in China. It not only 
has a large number of employees, but also contributes a relatively large percentage to 
GDP. For instance, in 1995 the textile and garments industry employed 12.43 million 
workers, representing 10.18% of the total national industrial workforce. The total value of 
output was 703.5 billion yuan (US $84.86 billion) (CESTT, 1996), which accounted for 
7.7% ofthe nation's total industrial output value (calculated by the author). China is not 
only the world's largest textile producer (Xu, 1996), but also is a large textile and 
garments exporter. By 1993, its share in the world's textile and garments trade was 
already 13.8%. In terms of the export volume (measured by the number of textile 
products), China ranks first; and in terms of export value (measured in U.S. dollars), it 
ranks third in the world, with exports ofUS $27.1 billion, accounting for 29% of China's 
total export value of 1993 (Xu, 1996). Currently, the textile and garments industry is 
China's largest foreign exchange earner. 
However, due to the backward technology of this industry, the Chinese products, 
to a certain degree, cannot completely meet both international and domestic consumers' 
needs any longer. The products, such as clothing, are still of medium grade. The 
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technology and techniques used in China's textile industry are, for most small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, at the level of the Europe-American textile industries in the 
1970s' and 1980s'. The energy consumption per unit of production in China is 1 to 2 
times that of the developed countries, and the average production efficiency is only 1/3 to 
1/8 ofthe level of developed countries (CESTT, 1996). Furthermore, in the recent years, 
international competition and the Chinese consumers' demands have increased greatly. 
Correspondingly, Chinese textile and garments enterprises have to increase their imports 
of high quality manufactured materials that domestic producers cannot supply due to the 
backward technology. Muo (2000, p.292) indicated that "imports increased from US 
$2.74 billion in 1985 to US $16.89 billion in 1995". Within ten years, the net increase of 
imports is about US $14.15 billion, and the annual rate of growth is 19.9%, which is 7% 
higher than the growth rate of total imports during this period. To be more detailed, fiber 
imports in 1985 were US $2.3 billion, making China the third largest importer in the 
world after Japan and Italy; ten years after, fiber imports increased to US $5.071 billion 
and since then China has become the world's largest textile materials import country. 
These imported materials are crucial for supporting China's textile and garments export, 
and the data clearly indicate the domestic textile materials producers lack of 
competitiveness in this respect, and will be in a worse situation after China's WTO 
accessiOn. 
In garments importation, although compared to other large garments import 
countries, such as the U.S., Italy, and Japan, China has a very small value in garments 
import, the annual growth rate in this area, especially during 1990s, is striking. In 1990, 
the value of garments import was US $68 million, in 1993 it increased rapidly to US $509 
million, and in 1995 it increased to US $905 million, which is about 905 times the level 
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in 1978 (Muo, 2000). 
THE IMPACT: 
For a long time, China's textile and garments industry was under the protection of 
high tariffs. For example, in 1992 the average tariffwas 68.4% (Muo, 2000). Although 
before April 15\ 1996, the Chinese government had reduced the tariff rate twice, the 
average tariffwas still as high as 50% (Muo, 2000). lfthe effects of non-tariff measures 
are included, the real import tariff rate would be much higher than 50%. From the 
analysis above, one can see that even with this kind ofhigh tariff protection, foreign 
products still hold a fairly large share of China's materials markets. After China's entry 
into the WTO, foreign products will have easier access to the domestic markets, and the 
shares will therefore increase. This, of course, will threaten a number of domestic textile 
and garments enterprises' survival. Furthermore, as these enterprises have been protected 
for a long time, their production scales and technological capabilities are likely to be 
significantly behind the foreign competitors. Inevitably, their viability is very limited. 
Muo (2000) estimates that China's national average tariff rate oftextile and garments is 
currently 38.9%, which implies that the current tariff rate will be decreased by at least 
10% to meet the WTO agreement. Muo also estimated that if China dismantles all the 
non-tariff measures, 7% of domestic enterprises would suffer large negative impacts or 
face bankruptcy. In addition, since this industry is an important one in China, and there 
are millions of Chinese workers employed in this industry, the negative effects ofWTO 
entry on the textile and garments industry will pose serious challenges to the stability of 
the national economy and for society. 
An important point to keep in mind is that even though China has strong 
comparative advantage and exports a lot in this industry, it does not necessarily mean that 
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the industry is profitable. Before 1999, China's textile industry had six straight years of 
deficit (CEIN, 1999). In fact, it is the subsidies from the central government that allow 
China to be the major exporter with these great losses. However, the reason that the 
Chinese government is willing to pay subsidies to the textile industry is that this sector is 
a major foreign exchange earner. For example, in 1998 for each ton of cotton 
consumption, the government added a subsidy of 1,140 yuan, equivalent to US 6.2 cents 
per pound to the textile industry (Shi, 1999). Therefore, the real situation of this industry 
indicates that the export volume and value are not good indicators of the competitive 
strength of China's textile industry. 
Nevertheless, the positive effects of entering into the WTO are also embodied in 
two aspects- importation and exportation. In importation, firstly, as foreign counterparts 
rush into the domestic markets, Chinese enterprises will try to promote their capacity to 
compete in terms of reducing the production cost, and increasing the quality and variety 
of their products instead of pursuing government protection and priority treatments. 
Secondly, entering into the WTO will enable local enterprises to import materials and 
advanced machines, such as cotton, wool, chemical fiber, high-quality clothing materials 
and new-type spinning machines, which are currently restricted by high import tariffs. 
This will directly support the improvement of production and technology. 
In exportation, China will benefit greatly from the membership of the WTO. At 
present, about half of the products produced by Chinese textile and garments industry are 
exported to the international markets. However, these exports have long been subject to 
discrimination and restriction. Western countries have set up various obstacles (mainly 
import quotas), to restrict the entry of Chinese textile and garments. For example, in the 
MFA (Multifiber Arrangement), the amount of Chinese textile and garment products is 
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strictly limited. Although compared to other textile and garments export countries China 
has a relatively larger share of the U.S. and the European Union's quota, the size of the 
quotas still substantially restricts China's exports. Therefore, entry into the WTO will 
provide more and bigger markets for China to export textile and garments among the 
WTO member countries, and better MFN (most-favored-nation) treatment8 for China's 
export as well. Furthermore, according to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
reached at the Uruguay Round, after a 10-year transition period beginning in 1995, 
textiles will no longer be subject to the MFA. However, this agreement stipulates that 
only those who have entered the WTO can enjoy this benefit (Xu, 2000). It is estimated 
that if China's MFA quotas were abolished, the output of Chinese apparel would expand 
by close to 500% (The World Bank, 1997). Therefore, WTO entry is very crucial in 
China's pursuit for a better position in international textile and garments trade. 
After 1999, as China has reduced the number of cotton spinning operations that 
were unprofitable, and adjusted the structure of the textile and garments industry, this 
industry is running more profitably than before. For instance, the entire industry earned 8 
billion yuan (about US $1 billion) in profits during the first six months of2000, three 
times more than the same period in 1999. At the same time, the improvement in the 
international environment will create favorable conditions for expanding export, and thus, 
accelerate the process of the reform in China's textile industry and its technological 
transformation. It is predicted that Chinese textile and garments will increase 10% in the 
share of international markets by 2005, which means US $5 billion more export income 
8 The requirement for trade in services, under which "each Member shall accord immediately and 
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than it 
accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country. 
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in this area (Yang, 1999), or 10% of the total textile export value of 1999. Therefore, 
China's entry into the WTO is imperative for the sake of textile and garments exports. 
2. The Consumer Goods Industry 
CURRENT SITUATION: 
China's consumer goods industry is relatively well equipped to compete in both 
domestic and international markets. In 1993, the output value of China's household 
consumer goods9 industry reached US $54.375 billion. The export value was US $30 
billion, accounting for one-third of the country's total export value, and about 38% of the 
consumer goods industrial output value (Xu, 1996). In 1998, consumer goods export 
totaled US $54.96 billion, which accounted for 36% oftotal consumer goods industry 
output (Tong, 1999). Evidently, within only five years, the export value in 1998 exceeded 
the total output of 1993. In recent years, exports in this industry have increased rapidly 
with more and more varieties of products entering international market. "These exports 
include shoes, toys, cases and bags, arts and crafts, metal products, bicycles, electric fans, 
sewing machines, clocks and watches, furniture, hardware, leather goods, batteries, 
essence and spices, ceramics, and cultural, educational and sports articles" (Xu, 1996, 
p.126-127). As a result, China has become a major exporter of consumer goods in the 
world and has accounted for a major share of the world market. Moreover, in 1998, the 
proportion of total exports produced by state-owned enterprises dropped to 63% while the 
proportion of private enterprises rose to 37% ofthe output value (Tong, 1999). This 
indicates that this industry will be able to adapt to the market-oriented economy more 
9 Goods and services bought for personal and household use. 
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easily under the WTO system. Additionally, during the 20 years since the "open door" 
policy was introduced, the consumer goods industry has absorbed US $40 billion in 
foreign investment, and the number of foreign-funded enterprises reached 20,000 in 1998 
(Tong, 1999). All of this shows that China's consumer goods industry has reached a 
certain degree of openness. Therefore, entering the WTO will not affect this industry 
significantly. In other words, China's consumer goods industry will face more 
opportunities than challenges after WTO entry. 
THE IMPACT: 
Currently, some domestic enterprises in this industry, such as Qingdao Hai'er, 
Jinan Qingqi and Wuxi Little Swan, have successfully gained international reputations 
and been investing abroad to establish competitive multinational enterprises. For 
example, Qingdao Hai'er has already successfully sold its products to more than 160 
countries. In 2000, it earned US $280 million in international markets. It also established 
a factory and a design center in the U.S. recently (Haier, 2000). WTO entry will bring 
more markets and opportunities for them, and at the same time lower their costs of 
imported raw materials. In the long term, increased exports and foreign investments 
resulting from WTO entry will accumulate capital, technology, and management 
experiences to help adjust China's industrial structure and accelerate technological 
upgrading in consumer goods enterprises. 
Nevertheless, challenges still exist, especially for state-owned enterprises. At 
present, "most of China's consumer goods are labor-intensive products that belong to 
medium- and low-grade products, characterized by outdated patterns, single function, and 
unstable quality" (Xu, 1996, p.127). These will create negative effects for China-made 
products to compete with their counterparts from developed countries, such as Japan, the 
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U.S. and the European industrial countries. Although the proportion of Chinese high-
grades and high technology products is increasing, they are still in the infant stage. As a 
result, China's technology-intensive enterprises in this industry may suffer from foreign 
competition. China has, and will continue to, develop well in the mess consumer markets. 
IV. (iv) Financial Industries 
1. The Banking Industry 
In order to enter the WTO, China has to concede in many areas. Among these 
areas, the banking industry is one of the western countries' main targets. 
CURRENT SITUATION: 
Compared to domestic banks, foreign banks have many advantages that will threaten 
the development of Chinese banks. Foreign banks have greater capital strength. For 
example, "the National City Bank ofNew York has more than US $700 billion assets, 
which is nearly equal to the total assets of China's four major state-owned commercial 
banks combined" (Muo, 2000, p. 232). Moreover, because ofthe legacy of China's 
planned economy, Chinese banks usually have more interference from the government, 
whereas most foreign banks do their business according to the rules of the market, which 
allows them to effectively avoid most of the bad debts. For instance, American banks' 
bad debt rate is about 0.67%, but Chinese banks' debt rate is 30 times higher than that 
(Muo, 2000). Table 9 provides the rating of the stability and assets of the four major 
state-owned commercial banks; no major Chinese bank has an "A" ranking. 
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Table 9: The Ranking of Chinese Banks (1999) 
Bank Rating Balance Date Assets (Bil.RMB) 
Indus & Com Bank of China BB+/Stable/B- Dec. 1999 3,540 
Bank of China BB+/Stable/B Dec. 1999 2,904 
China Construction Bank BB+/Stable/B Dec. 1999 2,201 
Agricultural Bank of China BB+/Stable/B Dec. 1999 2,200 
Source: http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratmgs/financtalmstttutwns/165515f.htm 
THE IMPACT: 
As well as greater assets, foreign financial institutions have better management 
systems and more experience. Their hardware and software are much better than that of 
Chinese banks, and their financial products contain a greater use of higher technology. 
For instance, on-line banking and telephone banking have become very common services 
provided by foreign banks. However, in China most commercial banks do not have the 
ability to provide these kinds of services. Even if a couple of banks can provide these 
services, such as the Merchant Bank of China (the author once had an internship there), 
since they just began these operations, the quality is low and the products are very simple. 
On the other hand, the number of Internet users in China is soaring. The Chinese 
government's Internet Information Center reported that the pace of increase was 
substantially fast in 1999. It grew four times from the previous year to 8.9 million users at 
the end of 1999, and the number of users is expected to reach 20 million by the end of 
2001 (AEN, 2000). Compared to China's total population of 1.3 billion, this number is 
very small; however, as the size of a potential market, no one can ignore the trend. 
Presently, the Chinese banking system is neither fit for this current change nor the 
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situation of dramatically increasing numbers of Internet users. Thus, this might provide 
opportunities for foreign banks to compete with domestic banks, especially in the market 
segments of youth and high-income consumers. 
Furthermore, after WTO entry and China's openness in the financial market, 
foreign banks will need many local people with knowledge and experience in banking. 
As these foreign banks have higher stronger capital capacity, they can use higher salaries 
to attract the people with better skills and abilities from Chinese banks. When these 
people leave Chinese banks, they will also bring a number of clients to the foreign banks. 
Therefore, Chinese banks are in the worst situation competing with foreign banks, and the 
challenges and pressures they are going to face will be enormous. 
The other concern is that foreign banks' entry into China's financial market will 
make it more difficult to control in the macro economy. For instance, foreign banks can 
influence China's industrial adjustment. As Muo (2000) argued, foreign banks' rule of 
business is pursuing the maximization of profits, which may drive them to invest in some 
industries that need to be limited according to domestic economic policy. Additionally, 
because the Chinese government cannot completely control the capital from foreign 
banks, these banks, might suddenly withdraw their investments from China's financial 
markets, such as the securities market. As a result, this will cause fluctuations in China's 
securities and other markets. Thus, the entry of foreign banks will have potential negative 
impacts on the stability of China's financial market. 
However, according to Chinese financial regulations, in the short run, China is 
unlikely to experience a crisis like that of several Southeast Asian countries and South 
Korea in 1997 for the following reasons. First, and most important, the Chinese currency 
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is not convertible for capital account transactions. This means that speculators, foreign or 
Chinese, have no way to act on a belief that the renminbi is overvalued and likely to 
depreciate (Lardy, 1998). Normally, speculators would borrow domestic currency and 
sell it for foreign exchange with the expectation that they would profit from an ensuring 
depreciation that would allow them to repay the domestic currency at a lower price. 
However, China's foreign exchange market is only open to those buyers with a 
demonstrated need related to trade, tourism, studying abroad, repayment of previously 
approved foreign currency borrowing, or repatriation of profits derived from a prior direct 
investment (Lardy, 1998). Secondly, the share of China's borrowing that is short term is 
lower than in the countries involved in the Southeast Asian Financial Crisis. For example, 
Lardy (1998) reported that, at the end of 1996, almost 90% of China's external debt was 
medium and long term. By contrast, at the time of Korea's financial crisis in late 1997, 
US $66 billion, or 60% of its total external debt ofUS $ 110 billion, was short term. 
Thirdly, in the 1990s, China experienced record trade surpluses during the Ninth Five-
Year Plan period (1997-2001), with a total surplus ofUS $149.4 billion, and at the end of 
2000, China's foreign exchange reserves reached US $165.6 billion (Xinhua Daily, 2000). 
Therefore, after WTO entry, China's financial market will still be in a relatively stable 
situation. 
One should realize that there also exist some positive effects on this industry after 
China's WTO accession. Firstly, it increases the channels for foreign capital entering 
China's economy. It will, to an important degree, release the shortage of capital in 
domestic investment and development. Secondly, it is propitious to the improvement of 
China's investment conditions. For example, as Muo (2000, p.241) argued, "by the end of 
1998 there have been 324,700 foreign-direct-investment (FDI) enterprises authorized, and 
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about 200,000 FDI enterprises have set up their business, which need US $267.453 
billion foreign capital". There is no doubt that the few Chinese state-owned commercial 
banks will not be able to cater to the huge amount of financial demands. Therefore, 
introducing foreign capital and financial institutions will promote and attract more 
multinational corporations to China. Thirdly, the advent of foreign banks will provide 
opportunities for domestic banks to learn directly from their competitors, enhance the 
level of management and services, and speed the modernization and internationalization 
of China's financial system and institutions. All the above factors will eventually lead to 
a more market based allocation of credit and push China towards a more market-oriented 
economy. 
2. The Insurance Industry 
In the negotiation of China's WTO entry, opening China's insurance market is 
another important matter. The U.S. and other western developed countries have high 
requirements in this field. On April 51h 1999, just one day before Prime Minister Zhu 
Rongji left China for the U.S. and Canada, China authorized four foreign insurance 
companies to operate in China's market. Among them, two are American companies; one 
is Canadian and the other is British (Muo, 2000). This indicates that China is sending out 
a signal to those western countries that it will open its insurance market greatly in the 
near future. 
CURRENT SITUATION: 
The insurance industry in China has faced many difficulties since the founding of 
the People's Republic of China in 1949. Not until the resumption ofbusiness operations 
of the original Chinese People's Insurance Corporation in 1980, in response to the needs 
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of China's market reforms, did it enjoy rapid growth. Muo (1999) noted that from 1980 to 
1998 China's insurance premiums enjoyed an average annual growth rate of34%, much 
higher than the 9.7% GDP annual growth rate during the same period. By the end of June 
1999, the total assets of China' s insurance industry topped 234 billion yuan (US $28.2 
billion). It is also predicted that in the coming five years China's insurance industry 
should maintain a growth rate of 13%. By 2004, total insurance premiums should top 260 
billion yuan (US $31.4 billion), achieving an insurance density of 200 yuan (US $24) per 
person (Muo, 1999). 
However, China's insurance industry is not really ready for openness and 
competition. Compared to famous western insurance companies that have more than one 
hundred years history of operation, Chinese insurance companies only have a few 
decades of development. Their experience and technology in management are limited and 
backward, to say nothing of their capital strength. For example, in 1997 the assets of the 
biggest Chinese insurance company, People's Insurance Company of China, were 102.9 
billion yuan (US $12.41 billion) (Yang, 1999). However, in order to enter the Chinese 
market, foreign insurance companies are required to have at least US $5 billion assets. 
Currently, those foreign insurance companies that have already opened their business in 
China have more than one hundred years of history and US $30 billion assets, which is 
more than the current total annual premium of Chinese market (Muo, 2000). 
THE IMPACT: 
Historically, China's insurance market has not been paid much attention. There 
are two main reasons for this. First, the government did not put enough emphasis on the 
development of the insurance industry in the past. Second, the life insurance system in 
the past was replaced by the socialist welfare system, especially in the urban areas. Thus, 
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for a long time China's domestic insurance institutions did not hold a big market, even 
before any foreign insurance companies entered the domestic market. For instance, "by 
the end of 1997, China's household savings had reached 4,600 billion yuan (US $554.89 
billion), whereas the total income of the insurance industry was only 108 billion yuan 
(US $13.03 billion)" (Muo, 2000, p. 77), far behind the level of savings. This shows that 
China's insurance industry is in the infant stage, but at the same time implies that the 
potential market is very huge. 
WTO entry and openness in the insurance market will provide opportunities for 
the development of China's national insurance industry. The intense competition from 
foreign companies will force domestic companies to adjust their management system and 
mechanism, exploit and create new insurance products. In the first two years, foreign 
insurance companies can only posses at most 50% ownership in joint venture insurance 
company. Therefore, the domestic insurance companies may be able to improve their 
competitiveness during this transition period. Although all of these changes are being 
forced, it will help the survival of the national insurance industry and improve its future 
development. 
IV. (v). The Telecommunications Industry 
CURRENT SITUATION: 
China has an enormous telecommunications market. Although a one-year increase rate 
is inadequate to determine a general trend, it is nevertheless remarkable that this market 
has expanded dramatically. From Table 10, it can be seen that the total market size 
increased from US $8.7 billion in 1996 to US $10.0 billion in 1997, a growth rate 
14.94%, nearly twice of the annual GDP growth rate in 1997. The growth rates of exports 
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and imports were more remarkable, being 150% and 16.67% respectively (Chismar, 
1996). 
Table 10: The Size, Exports and Imports of Chinese Telecommunication Market 
1996 1997 
Total market Size US $8,700 Mil US $10,000 Mil 
Total Local Production 3,500 5,000 
Total Export 800 2,000 
Total Import 6,000 7,000 
Source: 
http://www. state. gov /www I about_ state/business/ com _guides/ 1998/ eastasia/ china98 .html 
Currently, the Chinese telecommunications market is dominated by a small 
number of state-owned enterprises. There is not a single foreign company operating in 
this market. The temptation of China's telecommunications market and its future 
potential has meant that both domestic and foreign companies want a share of the market. 
That is why in the negotiation of China's entry into the WTO, opening the 
telecommunications industry and market was another important issue. 
THE IMPACT: 
On February 15, 1997, the 69 WTO member nations that handled over 90% of 
global telecommunications business, officially signed the Basic Telecommunications 
Agreement (Chinaonline, 2000). This Agreement shows that opening telecommunications 
markets globally is a world trend that any single country will find difficult to avoid. 
Therefore, after China's entry into the WTO, opening the domestic telecommunications 
market is just a matter of time. 
In the short term, WTO entry and the opening of the telecommunications market 
61 
will weaken Chinese telecommunications enterprises' monopoly situation. Foreign 
telecommunications companies have advantages in capital, technology, management, 
experience, and services, whereas Chinese enterprises have never experienced 
international competition. Once China opens this market, they will lose their monopoly 
situation, and compete equally with those international magnates. Western countries have 
required China to make many concessions in this market. For example, foreign 
companies acquired the rights to be able to invest 25% and 31% respectively in China's 
basic and value-added telecommunications industries, and the U.S. even asked for 60% 
(Chen, 1999). If China does make the concession, as western countries require, the 
domestic telecommunications industry will be bound to suffer severe impacts in the early 
stage, especially in domestic long distance and international call services. 
Another negative impact is due to the faultiness of the policies and regulations in 
China's telecommunications industry. Many policies and regulations cannot adapt to the 
current market requirements, and it is also impossible to build a perfect 
telecommunications policy management system within a short time (Geng, 1999). Thus, 
it is difficult to protect domestic enterprises effectively from the foreign competitors' 
severe impacts during the early stage ofthe accession. 
Thirdly, since the telecommunications market in China's developed regions, such 
as southeast coastal areas and the major big cities, are well established and developed, 
foreign companies will tend to invest in these high profits areas. They may ignore remote 
and backward areas, because if they do invest there, they have to pay the high cost of 
establishing an infrastructure. Then, the unbalanced phase of China's telecommunications 
industry will become more and more serious. On the other hand, the competition from 
foreign companies will certainly lower the income and profit of domestic enterprises. 
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This again will affect domestic enterprises' investment and services in remote areas, and 
eventually adversely affect poor region's economic development. 
Finally, as a part of the WTO agreement, the Basic Telecommunication 
Agreement will require China to open its domestic telecommunications market to foreign 
companies eventually. However, many Chinese academics believe that the implication of 
this Agreement may threaten China's national security (Chen, 1999). 
Due to the concern of national security and the profit from China's big potential 
market, some Chinese experts do not agree about opening the telecommunications sector 
deeply. Nevertheless, the positive effects and opportunities of opening this market are 
also very obvious, especially for Chinese consumers, who will benefit greatly from the 
liberalization. 
Liberalization will accelerate the internationalization of China's 
telecommunications industry. In the past five years, China's communication market has 
increased five fold, mobile communication services have doubled, and the number of 
clients has reached 100 million. At present, China has the second largest telephone net 
and the third largest mobile communication net in the world (Chen, 1999). All of these 
figures indicate that China's telecommunications industry has the potential capacity to 
compete in both domestic and international markets. Chen (1999) argues that, after WTO 
entry, China can first develop the operation in neighboring countries, such as Vietnam 
and Cambodia. 
Secondly, liberalization in the telecommunications industry will lower the cost of 
many communication-equipment-manufacture enterprises. Usually, the world's 
communication-equipment-manufacture enterprises purchase their components from all 
over the world, and so do Chinese enterprises (Chen, 1999). After WTO entry, China's 
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import tariff in this industry will be lowered at least by 3%, with tariffs on information 
technology products being eliminated (Geng, 1999). There is no doubt that this will 
reduce the costs of domestic manufacture enterprises greatly, and enhance their products' 
competitiveness in international markets. However, reducing or dismantling import tariffs 
is a double-edged sword; it will adversely affect domestic component producers, 
especially for semiconductors, computer and other high-technology communications 
equipment (Geng, 1999). Nevertheless, in this aspect, Chinese consumers will be the 
biggest winners. 
V. Policy Responses 
There will be both challenges and opportunities for China to enter into the WTO. 
It is possible, however, to minimize the effects of negative impacts and maximize the 
effects of positive ones. This requires the Chinese government applying adequate policies 
for the transformation from a non-member to a member of the WTO. 
Generally, China should open its domestic markets and industries gradually. 
Otherwise, the intense competition from foreign companies may have fatal impacts on 
some Chinese infant industries, such as the auto industry and the high technology 
industries. Consequently, this will cause enormous unemployment and other economic 
and social problems. Therefore, a certain degree of protection during the first few years 
after the accession is very necessary. However, those domestic enterprises should be 
aware that the protection is temporary to give them a chance (or buffer period) to improve 
their competitiveness and to learn from other foreign companies instead of remaining 
satisfied with their current situation. The protection today is for competition tomorrow. 
In order to minimize the cost and maximize the benefit of WTO entry on Chinese 
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economy, there are a number of things to be done. 
V. (i) For Agriculture 
In the agricultural sector, firstly, China could use certain WTO agreements to 
protect the domestic agricultural production from the impacts of foreign competitive 
agricultural products. However, although a certain degree of protection in agriculture is 
allowed in the WTO, it is a passive strategy. Protection itself will not improve China's 
agricultural sector. Thus, China has to adjust its agricultural production structure to make 
the best use of its comparative advantage. For this purpose, an optimal allocation of 
resources within the agricultural sector is of crucial importance. For example, as 
mentioned in Section IV (i), since China's fruit industry because of its labor intensity has 
a comparative advantage in international markets, the government can encourage this 
industry, and its related industries, such as fruit wine and fruit production. As a result, 
this might also release the pressure of high unemployment in China's rural areas. 
Secondly, the central government should invest more in scientific research and rural 
infrastructure to sustain productive growth and promote the modernization in agricultural 
production. 
In addition, in order to maximize the positive effects of the WTO membership and 
enjoy all kinds of rights, achievements and non-conditional MFN, especially the 
favorable treatment accorded to developing countries, China should uphold its position to 
join the WTO as a developing country and work out a rational tariff rate and time 
schedule that could best protect its agricultural sector. 
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V. (ii) For Industry 
For other major industries, the following steps may prove useful. Firstly, the 
central government should continue the reform of state-owned enterprises to improve 
their competitiveness. In order to do so, the central government should reduce some of 
the heavy social burdens of the state-owned enterprises. For instance, as mentioned in 
Section III (i), one of the most important and common burdens is pensions. China's 
pension system is not rational in terms of the retirement age. As Lardy (1998) argues, 
China's retirement age is relatively young, 60 for men and 55 for women. These ages 
were set in 1951 when the system was first established and average life expectancy was 
only fifty years. This pension system has not been adjusted upward despite the fact that 
life expectancy is now 71 years. The average worker retiring today will live an additional 
16 years, far longer than a worker retiring in the 1950s (Lardy, 1998). Thus, if the central 
government re-adjusts the retirement age to an older one, then the pension burden to the 
state-owned enterprises will be significantly reduced, because workers will work longer 
in their lives, at the same time rely on the pension for fewer years than before. The central 
government should also commercialize the state-owned enterprises into more modem and 
more profitable state-owned firms (Naughton, 1995). However, the pre-requisite of this is 
giving each stat-owned firm more autonomy in certain areas, particularly the 
determination of investment levels, the size of the employment establishment, the 
recruitment of managers, the level ofbasic salaries, and product prices (Child, 1994). 
Furthermore, developing a certain number of large enterprise groups is also an important 
means of raising productivity, improving economic returns, and eventually increasing 
state-owned firms' competitiveness on a global scale (Nolan and Dong, 1990). 
Secondly, it is very important to adjust China's industrial structure to a higher 
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technological level. As mentioned in the previous section, although some Chinese labor-
intensive industries are major exporters in international markets, such as textile and 
consumer goods industries, the products in these industries are of low- or medium-grade. 
Neo-classical economists may argue that since China's comparative advantage is in the 
low- and medium-grade products, there is no point in China developing high-grade 
consumer goods and competing with developed countries. However, in fact, not only is 
comparative advantage a dynamic factor, but consumers' demand is a dynamic factor. 
With the development of the world economy, consumers' demand has shifted to a 
relatively higher grade in many aspects. For example, the television market experienced 
black-and-white, color and current digital TVs. If some TV manufacturers still kept 
producing black-and-white TVs, they would certainly lose this market, although their 
products might be much cheaper than others. Thus, if Chinese consumer goods and 
textile and garments producers also keep maintaining their products in the original low 
and medium grades, they will gradually lose the international markets or even the 
domestic markets that they once dominated. Therefore, upgrading China's industries, 
especially labor-intensive industries, is a very important and necessary issue for China to 
make the best use of its comparative advantage in the future under the WTO system. 
Thirdly, according to the WTO agreement, since China is a developing country 
and many industries are either at the infant stage (such as high-tech industries and auto 
industry) or lack competitiveness (such as the machinery industry, the iron and steel 
industry, and the chemical and pharmaceutical industries), China will be allowed to put a 
certain degree of protection on these industries for a few years (usually 5) after WTO 
accession. Thus, for the purposes of improving and creating comparative advantage in 
key industries, such as the machinery industry, the iron and steel industry, the auto 
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industry, the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, and other high-tech industries, 
Chinese policy makers should design more protective and encouraging policies for the 
development of these industries. 
Fourthly, in order to legally protect China's major industries at the early stage of 
WTO entry when China has to substantially lower down its simple average import tariff 
rate, the central government could reduce the import tariff rates on raw materials and 
imported intermediate products instead of on final commodities. In this case, the simple 
average import tariff rate can be brought down, however, the import tariffs on the final 
products can still be maintained in a high level. As a result, the domestic final products 
will be protected by this high import tariff rates. At the same time, as the cost of 
production is reduced due to the decreased import tariff rates on raw materials and 
intermediate products, the price of Chinese final commodities will be lower. This will 
improve the competitiveness of Chinese final commodities in international markets. It 
can be seen that this method has the same effects as an export subsidy policy on domestic 
producers; however, it is more concealed. Nevertheless, this method also has some 
negative effects. For instance, since the import tariff rates on raw materials and 
intermediate products are very low, the domestic raw materials and intermediate products 
suppliers will suffer from it. Hence, when China wants to use this method, it should take 
into account its negative effects, and then pick the optimal tariff rates for these raw 
materials and intermediate products. 
V. (iii) For The Financial Industry 
One important response for China's financial industry is to reduce political 
interference in lending decisions (Lardy, 1998). For this purpose, more laws and 
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regulations based on the market economy should be designed to accelerate the process of 
marketization in this industry. As for how fast China's financial services industry should 
open to the outside world, it depends on many factors, such as the level of economic 
development, financial system reform, improvements in financial laws and regulations, 
the extent of government regulation of the financial industry, the management level and 
competitiveness of financial institutions, the development of the world economy and 
international financial markets, as well as their relations with China (Chinaonline, 2000). 
Therefore, China should proceed in an orderly, discreet and step-by-step fashion 
in opening its financial service industry. For instance, during the buffer period, in setting 
market access requirements, it should allow in only those foreign financial institutions 
that have a well established credit-worthiness and are really necessary to China, at the 
same time make sure that no foreign financial institutions with potential risks be allowed 
to enter. In expanding the scope ofbusiness and the clientele of foreign financial 
institutions, China should carry out experiments, and actively push forward financial 
system reform to improve the transparency, efficiency and competitiveness of the 
financial system, because they form the foundation for integrating into global finance 
(Chinaonline, 2000). Additionally, for the financial industry, training in analyzing cash 
flow, assessing repayment ability and risk management is also important to improve its 
competitiveness (Naughton, 1998). Thus, China should also invest more in training 
system for providing more human resources in the financial industry to cope with the 
increasing competition brought by WTO accession. 
V. (iv) For Labor Structure 
As WTO entry will likely provide big opportunities for China's labor-intensive 
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industries, many Chinese economists have estimated that China's entry into the WTO 
will provide 12 million working positions among those industries in the near future (Muo, 
1999). This, to some extent, will relax the severe pressure of the high unemployment rate 
in China since 1978, especially in recent years. Moreover, entry into the WTO will also 
accelerate the adjustment and optimization of China's labor structure. Some vocations, 
such as foreign language, international trade, international economic law, finance, 
tourism, computer science, information and other high technological professions will 
become very popular. However, some vocations that traditionally belong to a low 
industrial level and do not fit the current requirements of China's market economy and its 
global economic position (in terms of comparative advantage) will gradually lose their 
dominant situation in the market. Thus, WTO entry will drive China's economy and 
industries to move from internal (self-sufficient) to external (export) orientation, from 
low technology to a high industrial level, from low additional value to high profit, and 
from the agriculture and manufacturing industry to the service industry. At the same time, 
the labor market will adjust accordingly to adapt to the new economic situation and 
demand. Therefore, in the long-term, WTO entry will affect the adjustment of China's 
labor structure. 
In order to adapt to the changing structure of the labor force, China's education 
system should change correspondingly. More attention and investment should be 
addressed in the areas of computer science, communications, high technology, 
international finance and trade, international economy law, and foreign languages. 
V. (v) For The Social Security System 
As mentioned in Section V (iii), entering into the WTO will impact China's 
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insurance industry negatively in the short term. However, allowing foreign capital to 
enter the Chinese insurance market will benefit China's whole social security system. 
With the increase in competition in this market, the hospitalization insurance system and 
life insurance systems will be improved. As a result, the improvement in this area will 
help the reform of China's state-owned enterprises, because the development of a social 
safety net can release state-owned firms from their heavy burdens of pensions, health care 
and other social responsibilities. 
Competing with foreign insurance companies will also accelerate the process of 
commercialization and internationalization in domestic insurance industry. Also it will 
create new patterns of insurance services, and promote the enhancement of service 
quality. In a nutshell, after China's WTO accession, Chinese citizens will enjoy better, 
and more varied services from both domestic and foreign insurance companies. 
Thus, the Chinese government should encourage the development of a social 
safety net. 
VI. Conclusion 
From the analysis above, it is predictable that accession to the WTO will be 
helpful for China's economy and future development. In general, being a WTO member 
will enable China to increase exports and to attract foreign investment to introduce 
foreign high technology into domestic industries, and to participate in the establishment 
of new trade rules. It is also a good channel for Chinese enterprises to acquire advanced 
management methods, enjoy the MFN treatments among all the members, and accelerate 
the process of marketization and internationalization. 
However, entering the WTO is a double-edged sword. Although China will be 
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able to enjoy all kinds of favorable treatment provided by the WTO agreement, at the 
same time it has to face many obligations such as decreasing import tariff rates, 
dismantling non-tariff measures, and opening many important domestic markets. 
Furthermore, as the reform of Chinese laws, regulations, policies, economic and political 
systems have not been accomplished, friction between China and the WTO is inevitable, 
especially at the early stage of the accession (Xinhua Daily, 1999). 
As observed earlier, the impact of entry into the WTO will vary from one industry 
to another. These variations are dependent upon the extent to which the industry is 
currently liberalized and its current production efficiency. The industry's current export 
status (such as status as a major exporter) and comparative advantage are also important 
factors. Therefore, textile and garments, consumer goods, and other light industries will 
have more opportunities. Nevertheless, some land-intensive, capital-intensive and 
technology-intensive industries, such as staple foodstuffs, the auto, the steel and iron, 
and, computer and software industries will face drastic competition. Some service 
industries, such as banking, insurance and telecommunications industries, are still 
undergoing market economic reforms. As a result, they will be significantly challenged 
by the companies from developed countries. However, most of China' s industries will 
have opportunities and challenges at the same time. Also, the impacts of WTO entry on 
China's different ownership industries are various too. Generally, state-owned industry 
will likely face more challenges and fewer opportunities than other non-state-owned 
industries. 
Nonetheless, it is likely that the negative influences will be short-term, and that 
positive effects will be beneficial to many aspects of a country's development in long run. 
In China's case, WTO entry will not only have direct effects on China's foreign trade, but 
72 
also have positive impacts on the reform of its ownership system, and the adjustment of 
industrial structure, labor structure, and the social safety net system. In short, although it 
is unavoidable that China will face many challenges after WTO entry, the positive 
impacts will eventually outweigh the negative ones in the long run. 
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